On the Graded Acceptability of Arguments in Abstract and Instantiated
  Argumentation by Grossi, Davide & Modgil, Sanjay
On the Graded Acceptability of Arguments
in Abstract and Instantiated ArgumentationI
Davide Grossi
University of Groningen
Sanjay Modgil
King’s College London
Abstract
The paper develops a formal theory of the degree of justification of arguments, which
relies solely on the structure of an argumentation framework, and which can be suc-
cessfully interfaced with approaches to instantiated argumentation. The theory is de-
veloped in three steps. First, the paper introduces a graded generalization of the two
key notions underpinning Dung’s semantics: self-defense and conflict-freeness. This
leads to a natural generalization of Dung’s semantics, whereby standard extensions are
weakened or strengthened depending on the level of self-defense and conflict-freeness
they meet. The paper investigates the fixpoint theory of these semantics, establishing
existence results for them. Second, the paper shows how graded semantics readily pro-
vide an approach to argument rankings, offering a novel contribution to the recently
growing research programme on ranking-based semantics. Third, this novel approach
to argument ranking is applied and studied in the context of instantiated argumenta-
tion frameworks, and in so doing is shown to account for a simple form of accrual of
arguments within the Dung paradigm. Finally, the theory is compared in detail with
existing approaches.
1. Introduction
Argumentation is a form of reasoning that makes explicit the reasons for the con-
clusions that are drawn, and how conflicts between reasons are resolved. Recent years
have witnessed intensive study of both logic-based and human orientated models of ar-
gumentation and their use in formalising agent reasoning, decision making, and inter-
agent dialogue [2, 3]. Much of this work builds on Dung’s seminal theory of abstract
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argumentation [4]. A Dung argumentation framework (AF ) [4] is essentially a di-
rected graph relating arguments by binary, directed forms of conflict, called attacks.
The sceptically or credulously justified arguments are those in the intersection, respec-
tively union, of sets—called extensions—of ‘acceptable’ arguments evaluated under
various semantics (see [5] for an overview). Extensions are evaluated based on two
core principles. Firstly, a set of arguments should not contain internal attacks, that is, it
should be conflict-free. Secondly, it should defend itself in the sense that any argument
a in the set is either un-attacked, or if attacked by some argument b, there is then an
argument in the set that defends a by attacking b (in which case a is said to be defended
by, or acceptable with respect to, the set of arguments). Arguments and attacks may be
seen as primitive or assumed to be defined by an instantiating set of sentences in natural
language or in a formal logical language. The former case thus provides for charac-
terisations of more human-orientated uses of argument in reasoning, while in the latter
case, the claims of the justified arguments identify the non-monotonic inferences from
the instantiating set of logical formulae, thus providing for dialectical characterisations
of non-monotonic logics [4].
Dung’s theory has been extended in a number of directions. In particular, ‘exoge-
nously’ given information about the relative strength of arguments has been used to
determine which attacks succeed as defeats, so that the acceptable arguments are eval-
uated with respect to the arguments related by defeats rather than attacks. In this way
one can effectively arbitrate amongst credulously justified conflicting arguments. Ex-
amples include [6, 7, 8] that make use of a preference relation over arguments (where in
the case of [7], preferences are expressed by arguments that attack attacks amongst ar-
guments) and [9] that makes use of an ordering over the values promoted by arguments.
Other notable developments include approaches that associate probabilities with argu-
ments [10, 11], and weights on attacks so that extensions do not necessarily comply
with the conflict-freeness requirement on Dung extensions; arguments in an extension
may attack each other provided that the summative weight of attacks does not exceed
a given ‘inconsistency budget’ [12].1
Context: graduality in argumentation. It has long been recognized—since at least [14]
and [15]—that one of the drawbacks of Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation is the
limited level of granularity the theory offers in differentiating the strength or status of
arguments (essentially three, but cf. [16]). Consider the following informal example:
Example 1. Suppose an argument I concluding the presumed innocence of a suspect.
I is attacked by an argument G which consists of two sub-arguments G1 and G2 that
respectively conclude that a suspect had opportunity and motive, where G defeasibly
extends these sub-arguments to conclude that the suspect is guilty. Suppose an argu-
ment I1 (in support of an alibi) that attacks G1 on the assumption that the suspect does
not have an alibi. Suppose then an additional argument I2 that attacks an assump-
tion in G2. The level to which I is defended, and so said to be justified, is intuitively
increased in the case that we have counter-arguments I1 and I2 that argue against
1See also [13] which account for the relative strength of attacks amongst arguments.
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the suspect having motive and opportunity, as compared with when one only has the
counter-argument I1.
The above example highlights one amongst a number of intuitions that are for-
malised by the above mentioned [14] and [15], and more recently [17, 18, 19], in
which the numbers of attackers and defenders are used to give a more fine grained as-
signment of status to (and hence ranking of) arguments. While these approaches are
defined wth respect to AF s, the status of arguments is not determined using the stan-
dard ‘Dungian’ concepts of sets of arguments (extensions) and arguments defended
by these sets; rather, measures of the strengths of arguments based on the numbers of
attackers and/or defenders are propagated through the AF graph2. These approaches,
which we refer to here as ‘propagation based approaches’ (see [20] for a recent com-
parative overview), have also been developed to account for exogenously given infor-
mation about the strength of arguments, which provide the initial measures that are
then adjusted based on how they are propagated through the graph. Notable examples
of the latter include [21, 22] and [23].
Paper Contribution. The central aim of this paper is to show that a more fine grained
assignment of status to arguments that does not rely on exogenous information, and
thus only on the numbers of attackers and defenders of arguments, can be formalised
as a natural generalisation of the Dungian notions of conflict free sets of arguments
and the defense of arguments by sets of arguments. This aim is achieved in the fol-
lowing way. First, our starting point is the classical definition of an admissible set of
arguments as one that is conflict free and that defends all its contained arguments [4].
We show that the logical structure of this definition naturally generalises so as to yield
more fine grained graded notions of conflict freeness and defense that account for the
number of attackers and defenders, thereby obtaining a graded variant of the concept of
admissibility. Second, this graded form of admissibility serves as a basis for defining
graded variants of all the classic semantics of abstract argumentation studied in [4]:
complete, grounded, stable and preferred. Dung’s definitions of the standard seman-
tics can all be retrieved as special cases of our graded variants, showing that the form
of graduality this paper studies is rooted in a principled way in the classical theory of
abstract argumentation. These graded semantics are, intuitively, ways of interpreting
the standard Dung semantics in ‘stricter’ or ‘looser’ ways. For instance, the grounded
semantics can be interpreted more ‘strictly’ by requiring that all attackers be counter-
attacked by at least two arguments, instead of just one as in the classic case. So each
Dung semantics now comes equipped with a family of strengthenings and weakenings,
which we call graded semantics. Third, these strengthenings and weakenings define
a natural (partial) ordering dictated by set-inclusion: a stricter semantics will define
sets of arguments which are subsets of the sets defined by a weaker one. This natu-
ral ordering then induces an ordering on the arguments themselves, thereby defining
a ranking over the arguments in the framework. Such a ranking enables arbitration
amongst arguments without recourse to exogenous preference information. As this
2The exception being [19] in which the strength of arguments is evaluated by reference to two person
games in which a proponent defends an argument against counter-attacks by an opponent.
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ranking is induced from a generalization of Dung standard semantics, our approach
is at the outset methodologically distinct from propagation-based approaches, where
argument rankings are defined directly by reference to the argument graph. Fourth, we
study the application of graded semantics and their induced rankings to two key in-
stantiations of Dung AF s: classical logic instantiations that, under the standard Dung
semantics, yield a dialectical characterisation of non-monotonic inference in Preferred
Subtheories [24], and instantiations that accommodate more human orientated uses of
argumentation through the use of schemes and critical questions [25]. In so doing, we
seek to substantiate some of the intuitions captured by our generalisation of Dung se-
mantics, and show how the graded semantics capture a simple form of counting based
accrual of arguments, which has traditionally been regarded as being incompatible with
Dung’s theory [26].
Outline of the paper. The paper is structured in three parts. Part 1 concerns the devel-
opment of the abstract theory of graded argumentation. It starts with Section 2, where
we review Dung’s theory, giving prominence to its fixpoint-theoretic underpinnings,
which have remained relatively under-investigated in the literature, and that we thus
consider to be of some independent interest. Section 3 then generalises Dung’s notions
of conflict freeness and defense, yielding grading variants of these notions in terms of
the number of arguments attacking and defending any given awhose acceptability with
respect to a given set of arguments is at issue. This yields a ranking among types of
conflict freeness and defense. Section 4 then generalises Dung’s standard semantics, so
that extensions are graded with respect to the attacks and counter-attacks on their con-
tained arguments. These semantics—which we call graded—are shown to generalise
Dung’s theory and are studied providing constructive existence results. Part 2 first
shows, in Section 5, how the new graded semantics yield a natural way of ranking ar-
guments according to how strongly they are justified under different graded semantics,
thereby enabling endogenous arbitration among credulously justified arguments. Then,
Section 6 illustrates application of these type of rankings to ASPIC+ instantiations of
AF s [8] that formalise stereotypical patterns of argumentation encoded in schemes
and critical questions [25], thus accounting for more human-orientated uses of argu-
ment, and ASPIC+ instantiations of AF s that provide dialectical characterisations of
non-monotonic inference in Preferred Subtheories [24]. Both types of instantiation are
then shown to capture a simple form of counting based accrual, whereby multiple ar-
guments in support of the same conclusion mutually strengthen each other. In Part 3 ,
Section 7 develops a thorough comparison of our approach to the existing approaches
to graduality and rankings in argumentation, leveraging the systematization recently
introduced in [20]. This allows us to place more precisely graded argumentation in the
growing landscape of ranking-based semantics. We conclude in Section 8 outlining
some avenues for future research in graded argumentation.
2. Preliminaries: Abstract Argumentation
This preliminary section reviews key concepts and results from Dung’s abstract
argumentation theory [4]. The presentation we provide gives prominence to the fixpoint
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Figure 1: Argumentation frameworks
theory underpinning Dung’s theoretical framework. After [4] the fixpoint theory of
abstract argumentation has remained relatively under-investigated in the literature. It
is, however, the most natural angle from which to pursue the objectives of this paper.
We are unaware of any comprehensive exposition to date of the fixpoint theory of
abstract argumentation, and so hope this preliminary section is of independent interest.
Since this paper will provide a generalization of Dung’s original theory, all results
presented in this section can actually be obtained as direct corollaries of the results we
will establish later in Section 4. This, we argue, should be a desirable feature for any
theory of graduality in argumentation which bases itself on Dung’s original proposal.
For completeness of the exposition, direct proofs of the results dealt with in this section
can be found in Section 8.
2.1. Basic Definitions
Definition 1 (Frameworks). An argumentation framework (AF) ∆ is a tuple 〈A,〉
where A 6= ∅, and  ⊆ A2 is a binary attack relation on A. Notation x  y denotes
that x attacks y, andX  x denotes that ∃y ∈ X s.t. y  x. Similarly, x  X denotes
that ∃y ∈ X s.t. x  y. For a given ∆ we write x to denote {y ∈ ∆ | y → x} (the
direct attackers of x), and x to denote {z ∈ ∆ | z → y, y ∈ x} (the direct defenders
of x). Also, as is customary, + denotes the transitive closure of a given relation, so
that b + a stands for ‘there exists a path of attacks from b to a’. Finally, an AF such
that for each x, x is finite, is called finitary, whereas an AF with a finite number of
arguments A is called finite, else infinite.
We will sometimes refer to AF s as attack graphs.3 Figure 1 depicts three AF s.
An argument a ∈ A is said to be acceptable w.r.t. X ⊆ A, if any argument attacking
a is attacked by some argument in X , in which case X is said to defend a. An AF ’s
characteristic (also called ‘defense’) function, applied to some X ⊆ A, returns the
arguments defended by X [4] (henceforth, ‘℘()’ denotes powerset):
Definition 2 (Defense Function). The defense function d∆ : ℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for
∆ = 〈A,〉 is defined as follows. For any X ⊆ A:
3Although note that all definitions in this paper equally apply to ‘defeat’ graphs which assume a binary
defeat relation on arguments, obtained through use of preferences in deciding which attacks succeed as
defeats.
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d∆(X) = {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A : IF y  x THEN X  y}
Where no confusion arises we may drop the subscript ∆ in d∆.
An argument a ∈ A is not attacked by a set X ⊆ A if no argument in X attacks
a. One can define a function which, applied to some X ⊆ A in an AF , returns the
arguments that are not attacked by X . This function was introduced by Pollock in
[27] for his theory of defeasible reasoning, and we refer to it here as the ‘neutrality
function’.
Definition 3 (Neutrality Function). The neutrality function n∆ : ℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for
∆ = 〈A,〉 is defined as follows. For any X ⊆ A:
n∆(X) = {x ∈ A | NOT X  x} .
Again, where no confusion arises we may drop the subscript ∆ in n∆.
One final bit of terminology. In what follows we will often use the notion of
function iteration for d and n which we define in the standard inductive way, for
F ∈ {d, n}: F 0(X) = X; F k+1(X) = F (F k(X)).
Example 2 (Defense and neutrality in Figure 1). The functions applied to the symmet-
ric graph of Figure 1 (left) yield the following equations:
d(∅) = ∅ n(∅) = {a, b}
d({a}) = {a} n({a}) = {a}
d({b}) = {b} n({b}) = {b}
d({a, b}) = {a, b} n({a, b}) = ∅
Notice that the output of n on ∅ corresponds to the whole set of arguments, as no
arguments can be attacked by ∅. Notice also that while {a} and {b} are included in
n({a}) and n({b}), {a, b} is not.
One can define the extensions of an AF ∆ under Dung’s semantics, in terms of
the fixpoints (X = d∆(X) and X = n∆(X)) or post-fixpoints (X ⊆ d∆(X) and
X ⊆ n∆(X)) of the defense and neutrality functions, as recapitulated in Table 1. The
justified arguments are then defined under various semantics:
Definition 4 (Justification under Semantics). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉.Then for semantics S ∈
{grounded, stable, preferred}4, a ∈ A is credulously, respectively sceptically, justified
under S, if a is in at least one, respectively all, S extensions of ∆.
Finally, we recapitulate some well-known properties, first established in [4], of the
defense and neutrality functions that will be referred to later:
4Typically, the justified arguments are not defined w.r.t. the complete semantics, which subsume each of
grounded, stable and preferred.
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X is conflict-free in ∆ iff X ⊆ n∆(X)
X is self-defended in ∆ iff X ⊆ d∆(X)
X is admissible in ∆ iff X ⊆ n∆(X) and X ⊆ d∆(X)
X is a complete extension in ∆ iff X ⊆ n∆(X) and X = d∆(X)
X is a stable extension of ∆ iff X = n∆(X)
X is the grounded set in ∆ iff X is the smallest complete ext. of ∆ (X = lfp.d∆)
X is a preferred extension of ∆ iff X is a largest complete extension of ∆
Table 1: Classical notions of abstract argumentation theory from [4].
Fact 1. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF and X,Y ⊆ A. The following holds:
X ⊆ Y =⇒ d(X) ⊆ d(Y )
X ⊆ Y =⇒ n(Y ) ⊆ n(X)
d(X) = n(n(X))
That is, function d is monotonic, function n is antitonic, and the composition of n
with itself, which we will also denote n ◦ n, is function d. For example, in Figure 1
(right), we have that n({a}) = {a, d, e}, and n({a, d, e}) = {a, d} = d({a}).
Fact 2 (ω-continuity5). If ∆ is finitary, then d∆ is (upward-)continuous for any X ⊆
A, i.e., for any upward directed set D ∈ ℘(℘(A)) of finite subsets of A:6
d∆
( ⋃
X∈D
X
)
=
⋃
X∈D
d∆(X). (1)
Similarly, d∆ is (downward-)continuous for any X ⊆ A, i.e., for any downward di-
rected set D ∈ ℘(℘(A)):
d∆
( ⋂
X∈D
X
)
=
⋂
X∈D
d∆(X). (2)
The above fact establishes important properties of the behaviour of the defense
function with respect to sequences of sets of arguments and their limits. As we will
also later see in the graded generalization of Dung’s theory, these properties are key in
the construction of extensions through the iteration of the defense function.
2.2. The Fixpoint Theory of Acceptability and Conflict-freeness
We show how any admissible set of arguments can be saturated to a complete ex-
tension through a process of fixpoint approximation. This establishes a general result
5Cf. [4, Lemma 28].
6We recall that an upward directed set D ∈ ℘(℘(A)) is a set of sets such that any two elements X and
Y in D have an upper bound in D, that is, there also exists a superset Z ⊇ X ∪ Y in D. A downward
directed set is defined dually in the obvious way.
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concerning the computation of complete extensions in (finitary) attack graphs which,
to the best of our knowledge, has never been reported in the literature. It is, however, a
generalization of well-known existing results such as [4, Lemma 46, Theorem 47] (cf.
also [28]).
2.2.1. Construction of Fixpoints from Admissible Sets
Fix a framework ∆ and take a set X such that X ⊆ d(X) and X ⊆ n(X) (i.e.,
an admissible set). By iterating d, consider the stream of sets d0(X), d1(X), . . . , and
d0(n(X)), d1(n(X)), . . . . Since X is admissible, d is monotonic and n antitonic (Fact
1), the first stream (see the lower stream in Figure 2) is non-decreasing and the second
stream (see the upper stream in Figure 2) is non-increasing, with respect to set inclu-
sion. In finite attack graphs, these streams must therefore stabilize reaching a limit at
state |A| + 1. In infinite but finitary attack graphs, we will see that the limit can be
reached at ω. We will see (Lemma 2) that the limits of these streams correspond to
the smallest fixpoint of d containing the admissible set X and, respectively, the largest
fixpoint of d which is contained in n(X). We denote the first one by lfpX .d and the
second one by gfpX .d. Intuitively, the two sets denote the smallest superset ofX which
is equal to the set of arguments it defends7 and, respectively, the largest set which is not
attacked by X and which is equal to the set of arguments it defends.8 The construction
is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Example 3. Consider the cycle of length three in Figure 1 (center), and take the ad-
missible set ∅. By applying the above construction we obtain immediately d(∅) = ∅
as limit of the lower stream, and n(∅) = {a, b, c} = d({a, b, c}) as limit of the up-
per stream. ∅ is the smallest self-defended set containing ∅, {a, b, c} is the largest
self-defended set contained in n(∅).
We prove now the correctness of the above construction by showing that the limits
of the above streams correspond indeed to the desired fixpoints. First of all the follow-
ing important lemma shows how conflict-freeness is preserved by the above process of
iteration of the defense function:
Lemma 1. Let ∆ be a finitary attack graph and X ⊆ A be admissible. Then for any
n s.t. 0 ≤ n < ω,
X ⊆ dn∆(X) ⊆ n∆(dn∆(X)) ⊆ n∆(X).
That is, each dn∆(X) in the stream of iteration of the defense function from an
admissible set X is a conflict-free set. The lemma can be seen as a reformulation of [4,
Lemma 10], known as Dung’s fundamental lemma.9
We can show that the above streams obtained through the process of iteration of the
defense function construct the desired fixpoints:
7Theorem 1 will show this set is also conflict-free and it is therefore the smallest complete extension
containing X .
8Note that such a set is not necessarily conflict-free. E.g., consider ∆ = 〈{a, b, c}, {(b, c), (c, b)}〉, that
is b  c and c  b. Then n({a}) = {a, b, c} and d({a, b, c}) = {a, b, c}. But clearly it is not the case
that {a, b, c} ⊆ n{a, b, c}, that is, {a, b, c} is not conflict-free.
9It also generalises [4, Lemma 46] to the case of X admissible, instead of X = ∅.
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Xn(X)
n2(X)
n3(X)
n4(X)
n5(X)
n6(X)
. . . gfpX .d∆
. . . lfpX .d∆
Figure 2: Streams generated by indefinite iteration of n applied to an admissible set X (in symbols,
nω(X)). Position with respect to the horizontal axis indicates the number of iterations (growing from left
to right), while position with respect to the vertical axis indicates set theoretic inclusion. The lower stream
X, n2(X), n4(X), . . . stabilizes to lfpX .d∆. The upper stream n(X), n
3(X), n5(X), . . . stabilizes to
gfpX .d∆.
Lemma 2. Let ∆ be a finitary attack graph and X ⊆ A be admissible:
lfpX .d∆ =
⋃
0≤n<ω
dn∆(X) (3)
gfpX .d∆ =
⋂
0≤n<ω
dn∆(n∆(X)) (4)
Notice that since n2 = d (Fact 1), a stream generated by the indefinite iteration
of the defense function can actually be viewed as a stream generated by the indefinite
iteration of the neutrality function. So equations (3) and (4) of Theorem 2 can be
rewritten as follows:
lfpX .d∆ =
⋃
0≤n<ω
(n2∆)
n(X) (5)
gfpX .d∆ =
⋂
0≤n<ω
(n2∆)
n(n∆(X)) (6)
In this light, Lemmas 1 and 2 capture several of the key features of the stream generated
by the indefinite iteration of the neutrality function on an admissible set X . First, the
stream can be split into two parts, the part consisting of even and, respectively, odd
iterations of n∆. Second, the stream of even iterations converges to a limit which is
the smallest complete set including X , and the stream of odd iteration converges to a
limit which is the largest self-defended set contained in n∆(X) (that is, not attacked
by X).10 Notice that such a set is just free of conflict with respect to X , but it is not
necessarily conflict-free, and hence it is not necessarily a complete extension. Third,
10Again the finitariness assumption in the theorem could be lifted by making use of transfinite induction.
Cf. Remark 1 below.
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the two streams can actually be viewed as streams of the defense function d∆ applied
to X and, respectively, to n∆(X). Fourth, the two parts grow towards each other as the
stream of even iterations is increasing, while the one of odd iterations is decreasing.
See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Remark 1. The proof of Lemma 2 relies in an essential manner on the finitariness
assumption on the underlying framework. The assumption simplifies the proof but, it
should be stressed, could be lifted. For infinite graphs which are not finitary, the lemma
could be proved by resorting to transfinite induction:
d0∆(∅) = X
dα+1∆ (∅) = d∆(dα∆(X)
dλ∆ =
⋃
α<λ
dα∆(X) (for λ arbitrary limit ordinal).
By the monotonicity of d∆ it can then be shown that there exists an ordinal α of cardi-
nality at most |A| such that: lfpX .d∆ = dα∆(X). A proof of this statement in the general
setting of complete partial orders can be found in [29, Ch. 3]. Transfinite induction
relies on the Axiom of Choice (or equivalent formulations such as Zorn’s Lemma or
the Well-Ordering Principle), which is known to be required for the existence results of
the standard Dung semantics (cf. [30]).
2.2.2. Construction of Complete Extensions
With the above results in place, one can then show how complete extensions can be
constructed through a process of fixpoint approximation.
Theorem 1. Let ∆ be a finitary AF and X ⊆ A be admissible. Then the limit⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is the smallest complete extension of ∆ that includes X .
The theorem establishes that, in finitary frameworks, any complete set can be com-
puted via a process of iteration at ω of the defense function, starting with some admis-
sible set. It is a novel simple generalization of the earlier result in [4] for the case of
X = ∅. This process starts by including the arguments that have no attackers or that
belong to an initial admissible set, then including those arguments that are defended by
the first set of arguments included, and so on.11 At an intuitive level, the theorem states
that the indefinite iteration of the defense from an admissible X can be considered as
a formalization of the process whereby an agent constructs a rational argumentative
position—a complete extension—starting from X .
2.2.3. Construction of Other Dung Extensions
Theorem 1 also yields a constructive proof of existence (in finitary graphs) for
the grounded extension. By setting X = ∅ (the trivially admissible set), the theo-
rem returns the known result for the construction of the grounded extension lfp.d∆ =
11Cf. Remark 1.
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⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(∅) [4, Th. 47]. In this section we show how the theorem relates to the
other classical Dung extensions.
Specific conditions can be identified which guarantee that the indefinite iteration
of the defense function constructs preferred and stable extensions from a given ad-
missible set X . It is fairly easy to see that if the chosen admissible set X of ∆ is
‘big enough’ in the precise sense that it contains enough arguments to be able, from
some argument in X , to reach any argument in the graph via the attack relation, i.e., if
A ⊆ {a | ∃b ∈ X : b + a}, then the stream of iterations of d∆ from X converges to
a complete extension containing X (by Theorem 1), but this extension is now maximal
as all arguments in ∆ can be reached from X .
The condition under which Theorem 1 constructs stable extensions is particularly
interesting. If the streams of even and odd iterations of the neutrality function (recall
Figure 2) converge to the same limit, then the process of fixpoint approximation defines
a stable extension:
Fact 3. Let ∆ be a finitary AF and X ⊆ A be admissible. If ⋃0≤n<ω dn∆(X) =⋂
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(n∆(X)), then both sets coincide with the unique stable extension of ∆
that includes X .
Proof. By Theorem 1,
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is the smallest complete extension contain-
ing X . However, as
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) =
⋂
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(n∆(X)) by assumption, the set⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is therefore also a fixpoint of the neutrality function, and therefore a
stable extension.
This observation is, to the best of our knowledge, novel and provides a characteri-
zation of the existence of a stable extension that includes a given admissible set.
Example 4 (Construction of complete extensions in Figure 1). Consider the rightmost
AF . Starting with the admissible set {a}, the non-decreasing stream
{a} , {a, d} , {a, d} , . . .
converges after one step to the smallest complete extension lfp{a}.d = {a, d} contain-
ing {a}. The non-increasing stream {a, d, e} , {a, d} , {a, d} , . . . converges to gfp{a}.d =
{a, d}, i.e., to the same set which is also the largest fixpoint of d included in n({a}) =
{a, d, e}. As {a, d} is also conflict-free, it is a preferred extension. Notice also that
if we were to start with ∅, the resulting streams would be ∅, ∅, . . . and {a, b, c, d, e} ,
{a, b, c, d, e} , . . .. The first one constructs the grounded extension ∅ of theAF , and the
second the largest fixpoint of d in the AF , that is, {a, b, c, d, e}.
3. Graded Acceptability
We now turn to the main contribution of this paper: a graded generalisation of
Dung’s acceptability semantics. We first introduce the intuitions behind our general-
isation, and then define and study graded variants of Dung’s defense and neutrality
functions, which capture the proposed intuitions. These functions will then be used
later (Section 4) to define and study a family of graded variants of Dung’s semantics,
and the rankings they enable (Section 5).
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Figure 3: Variants of neutrality (left) and defense (right). The lower integer ` is, the more neutral is the set of
arguments X with respect to a (left). The lower integer m is and the higher integer n = min(n1, . . . , nk)
is, the better is a defended by X (right). Standard neutrality and defense correspond to ` = m = n = 1.
3.1. Introducing Graded Acceptability: Intuitions
The central tenet of argumentation theory is that any individual argument cannot,
in and of itself, constitute definitive grounds for believing that a claim is true. Rather,
the status of an epistemic claim as true justified belief is not established by an indi-
vidual argument, but through the dialectical consideration of counter-arguments and
defenders of these counter-arguments [31]. Similarly in practical reasoning, the status
of (a claim representing) a decision option supported by an individual practical argu-
ment is not considered to be the option that simply maximises a given objective, but
rather the best option contingent on having dis-preferred alternative options and refuted
challenges made to the assumptions made in support of the argument. Pragmatically
however, we operate under the assumption that the claim is true/the decision option is
the best available, to the extent that as of yet we know of no good reason to suppose
otherwise. Argumentatively, a claim can be considered established only in as much as it
is the claim of a justified argument included in a network of interrelated arguments and
counter-arguments. Dung’s abstract argumentation theory captures these principles by
assuming sets of arguments, rather than individual arguments, as the units of analysis,
and studying formal criteria (semantics) for sets of arguments to be acceptable. Apart
from trivial cases (unattacked arguments), arguments are acceptable only as members
of a set of acceptable arguments. The graded theory of acceptability that we aim at,
captures a notion of graduality while at the same time retaining the notion of a set of
arguments as the central unit of analysis.
3.1.1. Graded neutrality
According to the standard definition of neutrality (Definition 3) a set X is neutral
with respect to a if a is not attacked by any argument in X . A less demanding criterion
of neutrality of X with respect to a would require that there exists at most one attacker
of a in X , a yet less demanding one (or at least not ‘as demanding as’) would require
that there exist at most two attackers of a in X , and so on. Intuitively, these weakened
neutrality criteria capture the idea that one (two, three, . . . ) attackers are not enough
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to rule out the co-acceptability of a and its attacking arguments.12 One then obtains
a natural way to generalise the neutrality function (Definition 6 below) by making
explicit a numerical level ` of neutrality of a set of arguments with respect to a given
argument, as depicted in Figure 3 (left).13 So we say that a is `-neutral with respect to
X whenever there are at most `− 1 attackers of a in X .
3.1.2. Graded defense
According to the standard notion of defense, an argument a is defended by a set
of arguments X whenever every attacker of a is attacked by some argument in X .
The quantification pattern (‘for all’, ‘some’) involved in this definition offers again a
natural handle to generalise the notion of defense. If all but at most one attackers of a
are attacked by at least one argument in X , the quality of such defense (and hence the
extent to which a is acceptable w.r.t. X) can reasonably be considered ‘lower’ than in
the case in which all arguments are counter-attacked by at least one argument inX . But
the former quality of defense is still ‘higher’ than (or at least not ‘as low as’) the case in
which all but at most two attackers are counter-attacked by at least one argument in X ,
and so on. Similarly, if all attackers of a are counterattacked by at least two arguments
in X , then the quality of this defense can reasonably be considered ‘higher’ than in
standard acceptability, but ‘lower’ than (or at least not ‘as high as’) the case in which all
attackers of a are counterattacked by at least three arguments in X . Combining these
intuitions—depicted in Figure 3 (right)—one obtains a way to generalise the defense
function (Definition 5 below) by making explicit, through numeric grades (m and n) of
the above type, how well a setX defends an argument a. So we say thatX mn-defends
a whenever there are at most m− 1 attackers of a, which are not counterattacked by at
least n arguments in X .
This notion of graded defense is related in a natural way to the above notion of
graded neutrality: the set of arguments that are mn-defended by X , is the set of argu-
ments which is not attacked by at least m arguments, that are not in turn attacked by
at least n arguments in X (i.e., arguments that are m-neutral with respect to the set of
arguments that are n-neutral with respect toX). In other words, the notion of tolerance
towards attack (graded neutrality) can be iterated to obtain a notion of graded defense.
Fact 4 will establish this claim formally. We illustrate the above intuitions with a few
examples.
Example 5. In Figures 4i) – 4iv), the encircled set Xi defends ai (i = 1 . . . 4) under
Dung’s Definition 2. However we can differentiate these cases based on the number of
attackers and defenders of ai. For instance, X2 more strongly defends a2 than X1 de-
12Using terminology from logic, this may be viewed as an argumentative form of paraconsistency. In more
‘human orientated’ argumentation formalisms (e.g., [12] and developments thereof), this may be viewed as
accounting for an attacking argument not establishing definitive grounds for its claim (as discussed at the
beginning of Section 3.1), and hence not definitively ruling out the claim of the attacked argument.
13Weighted Argument Systems [12] propose a somewhat similar idea, whereby an inconsistency budget
sets a threshold on the number of attacks that can be tolerated within a given set. However, notice that our
notion of a threshold set, yielded by graded neutrality, is local in the sense that it pertains to the incoming
attacks on each individual argument. We will later compare this and other related approaches in more detail
(Section 7).
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fends a1, as a2 is defended by two arguments whereas a1 is defended by one argument
(i.e., the standard of defense that allows at most 0 attackers to not be defended by 2
arguments is met by X2’s defense of a2 but not by X1’s defense of a1). We will later,
in Example 12, reference the defense of a3 by X3 and of a4 by X4 to illustrate that
neither can be said to be a more strong defense than the other. While neither X5 or
X6 defend a5, respectively a6, under Dung’s Definition 2, observe that X5’s defense
of a5 is stronger than X6’s defense of a6. The former meets a standard of defense that
allows at most one attacker (d5) not to be defended by at least one defender (which
goes hand in hand with accommodating the co-acceptability of a5 with at most one
undefended attacker; i.e., d5 is 2-neutral with respect to X5). This standard is not met
by X6’s defense of a6, since a6 is attacked by two undefended attacks (from d6 and
e6). In the latter case, a weaker standard of defense is met, which again goes hand in
hand with accommodating the co-acceptability of a6 with its two undefended attack-
ers. These notions then naturally generalise so that one can discriminate standards of
defense based only on the number of attackers. Allowing at most one attacker not to be
defended by two arguments, is a standard of defense met by X1s defense of a1, but not
X3’s defense of a3 (the former defense thus being stronger than the latter).
3.2. Graded Defense and Neutrality Functions
Let us move now to the formal definitions of graded defense and neutrality. Take
an argument a and a set of arguments X . Let k be the number of a’s attackers
(b1, . . . , bk) and, for each bi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) let ni be the (non zero) number of attackers
of bi (i.e., defenders of a) in X . Finally, let n be the minimum among the nis, i.e.,
n = min({ni}1<i≤k). We can now count the number m (≤ k) of attackers of a, which
are counter-attacked by at least n arguments in X . Integers m and n therefore encode
information about how strongly a is defended by X , in the sense that they express a
maximum number (i.e., m − 1) of attackers of a which are not counterattacked by a
minimum given number (i.e., n) of arguments in X . We can now generalise Definition
2 as follows:
Definition 5 (Graded defense). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF and let m and n be two
positive integers (m,n > 0). The graded defense function dm
n
: ℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for ∆
is defined as follows. For any X ⊆ A:
dm
n
(X) = {x ∈ A | @≥m y : [ y  x AND @≥n z : [ z  y AND z ∈ X ] ]}
where ∃≥nx, for integers n (‘there exist at least n arguments x’) are the standard
first-order logic counting quantifiers.14 In the rare cases in which we need to make ∆
explicit we write d∆m
n
.
14Cf. [32]. The definition can be reformulated without counting quantifiers as follows:
dm
n
(X) = {x ∈ A S.T. | {y ∈ x S.T. | {z ∈ y ∩X} | < n} | < m}
where we write x to denote {y ∈ A | y → x}.
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X4
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b5
c5
X5
d5 a6
b6
c6
X6 d6
v) vi)
e6
{a2}
{c1, c2 , d2 , d3 , e3 , e4 , f4, g4} 
{a1}
{a3} {a4}
{b1 , b3 , c3 , c4}
{b2 , b4 , d4}
vii)
Figure 4: i)–vi) Xi∈{1...6} defending a1, . . . a6. vii) is the Hasse diagram of a preorder on the set of all
arguments from i)–v) relevant for Example 12.
So, dm
n
(X) is the set of arguments (in the given framework) which have at most
m− 1 attackers that are not counter-attacked by at least n arguments in X .
Example 6. In Figure 4, a1 ∈ d1
1
(X1) and a2 ∈ d1
1
(X2) since in both cases the
following holds: at most 0 arguments attacking a1, respectively a2, are not attacked by
at least one argument inX1, respectivelyX2. However if we increment n by 1 we have
that: a2 ∈ d1
2
(X2) but a1 /∈ d1
2
(X1) since it is the case that at least one argument
attacking a1 is not attacked by at least two arguments in X1. Intuitively, this standard
of defense allows for up to 0 attackers to not be counter-attacked by two defenders, a
standard met by X2’s defense of a2, but not by X1’s defense of a1. Continuing with
Figure 4, a5 ∈ d3
1
(X5) and a6 ∈ d3
1
(X6), since in both cases the standard of defense
that allows for no more than 2 unattacked arguments is met. However, a5 ∈ d2
1
(X5)
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and a6 /∈ d2
1
(X6) since this standard of defense accommodates up to a maximum of 1
unattacked attackers, and in the latter case there is more than one unattacked attacker
of a6. Finally, a1 /∈ d1
2
(X1) and a3 /∈ d1
2
(X3) since the d1
2
standard of defense
requires that all attackers of a1 (a3) are attacked by at least two arguments. However,
a1 ∈ d2
2
(X1) and a3 /∈ d2
2
(X3), since the standard of defense allowing at most one
attacker not to be defended by two counter-attackers is met by a1 but not by a3. Notice
that in this last case the two arguments a1 and a3 are discriminated based on the
number of their attackers.
By the same logic, Definition 3 can be generalised as follows:
Definition 6 (Graded neutrality function). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF and let ` be any
positive integer. The graded neutrality function nl : ℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for ∆ is defined
as follows. For any X ⊆ A:
n`(X) = {x ∈ A | @≥` y : y  x AND y ∈ X} .
So, given a set of arguments X , n`(X) denotes the set of arguments which have at
most `− 1 attackers in X .15
Example 7. In Figure 4, n2(X5) = {a5, b5, c5, d5}. Notice that n2({a5, b5, c5, d5}) =
{b5, c5, d5}. Also, n2(X6) = {b6, c6, d6, e6}.
3.3. Properties of Graded Defense and Neutrality
The following two facts show that the graded defense and neutrality functions are
generalisations of the standard functions defined in Definitions 2 and 3, and that such
generalisations remain well-behaved in the sense that they retain many of the key fea-
tures of their standard variants.
Fact 4. For any AF ∆ = 〈A,〉, m, n and ` positive integers:
d1
1
(X) = d(X) (7)
n1(X) = n(X) (8)
X ⊆ Y =⇒ n`(Y ) ⊆ n`(X) (9)
X ⊆ Y =⇒ dm
n
(X) ⊆ dm
n
(Y ) (10)
nm(nn(X)) = dm
n
(X) (11)
Proof. Equation (7) follows from the fact that Definition 2 can be retrieved from Defi-
nition 5 by setting n = m = 1. Similarly (8) follows from the fact that Definition 3 can
15Equivalently, graded neutrality can be defined as follows, without the use of counting quantifiers:
n`(X) = {x ∈ A S.T. |x ∩X| < `} .
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be retrieved from Definition 6 by setting ` = 1. Equation (11) follows from Definitions
5 and 6 by the following series of equations:
nm(nn(X)) = nm({y ∈ A | @≥n z : [ z  y AND z ∈ X]})
= {x ∈ A | @≥m y : [ y  x AND @≥n z : [ z  y AND z ∈ X]]}
= dm
n
(X)
Formulae (9) and (10) are direct consequences of Definitions 5 and 6.
Equation (7) reformulates d(X) as the set of arguments for which it is not the case
that there are one or more attackers, which are not counter-attacked by one or more
arguments in X; that is, no attacker is not attacked by some argument in X . So does
Equation (8) for n(X). The remaining formulae generalise Fact 1 to the graded setting.
In particular, graded defense is monotonic (10), graded neutrality is antitonic (9), and
equation (11) shows that, as in the standard case, the defense function is the two-fold
iteration of the neutrality function (as in the standard case we may use the notation
nn ◦ nm to denote this composition).
Importantly, the continuity of the defense function is also preserved in the graded
setting:
Fact 5 (ω-continuity of graded defense). If ∆ is finitary, then function dm
n
is (upward-)
continuous for any X ⊆ A, m and n positive integers. I.e., for any upward directed
set D of finite subsets of A:
dm
n
(
⋃
X∈D
X) =
⋃
X∈D
dm
n
(X) (12)
Similarly, dm
n
is (downward-)continuous for any X ⊆ A, m and n positive integers.
I.e., for any downward directed set D of finite subsets of A:
dm
n
(
⋂
X∈D
X) =
⋂
X∈D
dm
n
(X) (13)
Sketch of proof. The argument used to prove Fact 2 carries through in exactly the same
manner, exploiting the monotonicity of dm
n
(10) and the finitariness assumption over
∆.
Finally, we establish some properties showing how the values for the defence and
neutrality functions are affected by varying the parameters m and n.
Fact 6. For any AF ∆ = 〈A,〉, X ⊆ A, and `, m and n positive integers:
n`(X) ⊆ n`+1(X) (14)
dm
n
(X) ⊆ dm+1
n
(X) (15)
dm
n
(X) ⊇ d m
n+1
(X) (16)
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Figure 5: Depiction of the partial order over the set of all graded defense functions (with 0 < m,n ∈ N).
The horizontal and vertical axes consist of the values of m and, respectively, n. Arrows go from ‘weaker’
to ‘stronger’ defense functions. Dashed lines (diagonals) denote incomparability. The point m = n = 1
denotes the position that Dung’s characteristic function occupies in the ordering.
Proof. Recall the definition of the neutrality function (Definition 6). To establish (14)
it suffices to notice that the property expresses the contrapositive of the following state-
ment: if there exist at least ` + 1 attackers in X then there exist at least ` attackers in
X . Property (15) then follows directly by (14) above and (11) (Fact 4), through the
following series of relations:
dm
n
(X) = nm(nn(X))
⊆ nm+1(nn(X)) = dm+1
n
(X).
A similar argument applies to establish (16), which follows by (14) above, (11), and
the antitonicity of n (Fact 4):
dm
n
(X) = nm(nn(X))
⊇ nm(nn+1(X)) = d m
n+1
(X).
This completes the proof.
Intuitively, (14) states that the set of arguments attacked by at most ` arguments
in X is included in the set of arguments attacked by at most ` + 1 arguments in X .
This establishes an ordering, in terms of logical strength, among the values of different
neutrality functions: the lower is ` the stricter is the value of nl applied to a same set of
arguments X . Properties (15) and (16) then follow by combining this simple fact with
the fact that dm
n
is the composition of nm with nn (11).
3.4. Comparing Graded Defense and Neutrality Functions
Fact 6 provides ground for a natural way in which different graded defense and
neutrality functions can be ordered as their parameters m and n vary. The choice of
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Figure 6: Framework of Example 8
these parameters determines the logical strength of different ‘types’ or ‘standards’ of
conflict-freeness, which is based on neutrality, and acceptability, which is based on
defense.
In light of Fact 6, comparing different neutrality functions is straightforward. Any
relaxation on the requirement that no argument in a set be attacked by other arguments
in that set leads to weaker forms of conflict-freeness. For anyX ⊆ A, n`(X) ⊆ nk(X)
for k and ` positive integers whenever ` ≤ k. So neutrality functions can simply be
ordered linearly like natural numbers, with lower numbers denoting ‘stronger’ forms
of neutrality and hence conflict-freeness.
The ordering of defense functions is more interesting, as these functions are param-
eterized by two integers:
Definition 7. dm
n
 ds
t
(to be read “is at least as strong as”) iff for any X ⊆ A,
dm
n
(X) ⊆ ds
t
(X), with m,n, s, t positive integers.
Relation orders the set of all graded defense functions in a well-behaved manner:
Fact 7. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF , and let  be defined as above. Then:
(i) dm
n
 ds
t
iff m ≤ s and t ≤ n;
(ii) Relation  is a partial order, i.e., reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
Proof. (i) is a direct consequence of Fact 6. (ii) follows directly from how relation
 is defined and the properties of set inclusion.
The relation is depicted in its generality in Figure 5. Expressions dm
n
 ds
t
may be
read as follows: ‘being mn-defended is weakly preferable over being st-defended’ or
‘the mn-defense function is at least as strong as the st-defense function’. Intuitively,
the partial order  uses logical strength as a way to order graded defense functions.
This equates with the intuition that if an argument meets a demanding standard of
defense it also meets a less demanding one.
Example 8. Referring to the framework in Figure 6, we illustrate Formula (15) and
Fact 7: d1
1
({c1, c2}) = {c1, c2, b2} ⊆ d2
1
({c1, c2}) = {c1, c2, a, b2} ⊆ d3
1
({c1, c2}) =
{c1, c2, a, b1, b2}. We also illustrate Formula (16) and Fact 7 with reference to Figure
4ii): d1
1
({d2, c2, a2}) = {d2, c2, a2}⊇ d1
2
({d2, c2, a2}) = {d2, c2, a2}⊇ d1
3
({d2, c2, a2})
= {d2, c2}.
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3.4.1. On the Partiality of 
As the relation  is a partial order, some defense functions may be incomparable
(see Figure 5) and this, we claim, is intuitive. By way of example, consider Dung’s
defense d1
1
. This standard of defense is strengthened by d1
2
(higher n parameter) and
weakened by d2
1
(higherm parameter). But under the definition of, d2
2
defines a stan-
dard of defense which is incomparable with respect to d1
1
: it demands more defenders
per attacker, but tolerates more attackers that are not counter-attacked to the desired
level. In general, incomparability arises every time the parameters of the functions do
not meet the condition m ≤ s and t ≤ n of Fact 7.
It should be clear, however, that the partial order  over graded defense functions
could be further refined to a total order by resolving incomparability. This can be done
in two ways: by either giving priority to parameter m or to parameter n. For example,
if a set of arguments is mn-defended and another one is st-defended, where m < s
and n < t (i.e., they are incomparable w.r.t. ) then the first one can be stipulated to be
more strongly defended because it is less tolerant with respect to the failure of defense.
Therefore, for m < s and n < t, belonging to dm
n
(X) is ‘better’ than belonging to
ds
t
(X). One could then redefine  as follows: dm
n
 ds
t
iff either m < s, or m = s and
n ≥ t. This yields a lexicographic order over graded defense functions giving priority
to them parameter over the n parameter. We do not investigate such refinements further
in this paper.
4. Graded Semantics for Abstract Argumentation
By means of the graded defense and neutrality functions, Dung’s notions of accept-
ability and conflict-freeness can be generalised to graded variants in a natural way. A
set of arguments X is said to be conflict-free at grade ` (or, `-conflict-free) whenever
none of its arguments is attacked by at least ` arguments in X . A set of arguments X
is said to be acceptable at grade mn (or, mn-acceptable) whenever all of its arguments
are such that at most m− 1 of their attackers are not counter-attacked by at least n ar-
guments in X . A graded notion of admissibility follows (`-conflict-freeness plus mn-
acceptability) and we thereby obtain graded variants of all the main admissibility-based
semantics, which are simply Dung’s standard semantics based on graded admissibility
instead of standard admissibility. The first part of this section formally defines graded
semantics. The rest of the section then develops a core theory of graded semantics. In
the tradition of abstract argumentation, our results focus on the central questions of the
existence and construction of graded extensions, and provides positive results under
certain constraints on the parameters n, m and l.
4.1. Graded Generalisation of Dung’s Semantics
We are now in the position to generalise Definition 4 as follows:
Definition 8 (Graded Extensions). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF , X ⊆ A, and `,
m and n be positive integers. Graded extensions are defined as in Table 2. We
may write admlmn(∆), prflmn(∆) and stblmn(∆) to denote, respectively, the set
of lmn-admissible, lmn-preferred. and lmn-stable extensions of ∆, and grnlmn(∆)
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X is `-conflict-free in ∆ iff X ⊆ n`(X)
X is mn-self-defended iff X ⊆ dm
n
(X)
X is `mn-admissible in ∆ iff X ⊆ n`(X) and X ⊆ dm
n
(X)
X is an `mn-complete extension of ∆ iff X ⊆ n`(X) and X = dm
n
(X)
X is an `mn-stable extension of ∆ iff X = nn(X) = nm(X) ⊆ nl(X)
X is the `mn-grounded extension of ∆ iff X is the smallest `mn-complete ext. of ∆
X is an `mn-preferred extension of ∆ iff X is a largest `mn-complete ext. of ∆
Table 2: Graded generalizations of standard argumentation theory notions from [4].
to denote the lmn-grounded extension of ∆. Finally, for an extension type S ∈
{grounded , preferred , stable}, we say that a ∈ A is credulously justified w.r.t. `mn-S
if a ∈ ⋃S`mn(∆); and sceptically justified w.r.t. `mn-S if a ∈ ⋂S`mn(∆) Hence-
forth we assume the sceptical definition when referring to an argument simply as being
justified.
The definition deserves some comment. Note first of all that when l = m = n = 1,
we recover the standard definition of conflict-freeness, admissibility and extensions
(Definition 4), which we henceforth refer to as ‘Dung conflict-freeness’ and ‘Dung ad-
missibility’ and ‘Dung extensions’. The key notion is graded admissibility, which is
obtained by parameterizing the conflict-freeness requirement by ` — i.e., X ⊆ n`(X)
—, and parameterizing the self-defense requirement by m and n — i.e., X ⊆ dm
n
(X).
The remaining graded semantics are defined by extending graded admissability in ex-
actly the same way in which Dung admissibility is extended to define the standard Dung
semantics. So, a graded complete extension, with parameters `,m and n, is a fixpoint
of dm
n
, which is also `-conflict-free, the graded grounded extension is the smallest `mn-
complete extension, and the graded preferred extensions are the largest `mn-complete
extensions. Finally, a graded stable extension, with parameters `,m and n, is a fixpoint
of nn(X) and nm(X) (and therefore of dm
n
), which is also `-conflict-free. Constructive
existence results for these semantics are provided in the next section.
Each graded extension type should then be interpreted as a class of weakenings
and strengthenings of its standard Dung counterpart. For example: Dung complete
extensions are strengthened by 11n-complete extensions, with n > 1, which require a
higher number of defenders for each attacked argument (that is, the requirements for
acceptability are strengthened); and are weakened by `11-complete extensions, with
` > 1, which tolerate a higher level of internal conflict (that is, weakening the conflict-
freeness requirement), or by 1m1-complete extensions, with m > 1, which tolerate
a higher level of undefended arguments (that is, weakening the acceptability require-
ment). So for each Dung extension type, we now have an ordered family of extensions
incorporating a form of graduality.
4.2. Fixpoint Construction for Graded Exensions
We proceed as in the standard case (cf. Section 2). The basic idea is as follows:
given a graded admissible set, we show that, and under what assumptions on the pa-
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rameters `, m and n, this can be expanded into a graded complete set through a process
of fixpoint approximation.
Fix a framework ∆ and take a set X such that X ⊆ dm
n
(X) and X ⊆ n`(X) (that
is, an `mn-admissible set). By iterating dm
n
, consider the stream of sets
d0m
n
(X), d1m
n
(X), . . . (17)
and the stream of sets
nn(d
0
m
n
(X)), nn(d
1
m
n
(X)), . . . (18)
which, by Fact 4, is equivalent to the stream
d0n
m
(nn(X)), d
1
n
m
(nn(X)), . . . . (19)
By the above assumptions onX , and since dm
n
is monotonic and nn is antitonic (cf. Fact
4), the stream in (17) is non-decreasing and the stream in (19) is non-increasing, with
respect to set inclusion. In finite attack graphs, these streams must therefore stabilize
reaching a limit at iteration |A| + 1. In infinite but finitary attack graphs, we will
see that the limit can be reached at ω. We will also see (Lemma 4) that the limits of
these streams correspond to the smallest fixpoint of dm
n
containingX and, respectively,
the largest fixpoint of dn
m
which is contained in nn(X).16 We denote the first one by
lfpX .dmn
and the second one by gfpX .dnm. Intuitively, the two sets denote the smallest
superset of X which is equal to the set of arguments it mn-defends and, respectively,
the largest set whose arguments are not attacked by at least n arguments inX and which
is equal to the set of arguments it nm-defends. The above construction is illustrated in
Figure 7 below. We prove now its correctness showing that the limits of the streams in
(17) and (19) correspond indeed to the desired fixpoints.
First of all the following important lemma shows under what conditions on m and
n graded conflict-freeness can be preserved by the above process of iteration of the
defense function.17
Lemma 3. Let ∆ be a finitary attack graph, X ⊆ A be such that X ⊆ dm
n
(X) and
X ⊆ nm(X), and m,n be two positive integers such that n ≥ m. Then for any k s.t.
0 ≤ k < ω,
X ⊆ dkm
n
(X) ⊆ nm(dkm
n
(X)) ⊆ nm(X).
Proof. X ⊆ dkm
n
(X) holds by the assumption that X is admissible and by the mono-
tonicity of dm
n
(Fact 4). dkm
n
(X) ⊆ nm(dkm
n
(X)) is proven by induction over k. The
16Notice the reversal in the parametersm and n due to the fact that nn(dm
n
(X)) = dn
m
(nn(X)), a direct
consequence of Fact 4.
17In the following two lemmas we handle only parametersm and n directly. This, we will see, is sufficient
to establish results concerning also parameter ` later (Theorem 2).
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Xnm(X)
nn(X)
dm
n
(X)
dn
m
(nn(X))
nn(dm
n
(X))
=
d2m
n
(X)
d2n
m
(nn(X))
nn(d
2
m
n
(X))
=
. . .
. . . gfpX .dnm
nn(lfpX .dmn
)
=
. . . lfpX .dmn
Figure 7: The two streams of (17) and (19) under the assumption that X is mmn-admissible and the two
integers n and m are such that n ≥ m. Position with respect to the horizontal axis indicates the number
of iterations, and positions with respect to the vertical axis indicates set theoretic inclusion. Cf. Figure 2
depicts the same behaviour for the standard, non-graded, case.
base case holds by assumption as d0m
n
(X) = X is mmn-admissible and therefore
m-conflict-free. For the induction step assume (IH) that dkm
n
(X) ⊆ nm(dkm
n
(X)) (that
is, the kth step is m-conflict-free). We show that dk+1m
n
(X) ⊆ nm(dk+1m
n
(X)). Suppose
towards a contradiction that is not the case. Then there exists x and y1, . . . , ym in set
dk+1m
n
(X) = dm
n
(dkm
n
(X)) such that x   yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since n ≥ m by assump-
tion, by the definition of dm
n
there exist z1, . . . , zn ∈ dm
n
(X) such that y`   zi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, at least one among all yi’s (w.l.o.g. assumed to be ym) is attacked
by at least n arguments in dm
n
(X). But from this and the assumption that n ≥ m, there
exist w1, . . . , wn ∈ dm
n
(X) such that zn   wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, at least one
among all zi’s (w.l.o.g. assumed to be zn) is also attacked by at least n arguments in
dm
n
(X). Now since n ≥ m we conclude that dm
n
(X) is not m-conflict-free, against IH.
nm(d
k
m
n
(X)) ⊆ nm(X) follows from the first claim by the antitonicity of nm (Fact
4).
That is, each stage dkm
n
(X) in the stream of iteration of the graded defense function
from set X is an m-conflict-free set.
Lemma 4. Let ∆ be a finitary attack graph and X ⊆ A be such that X ⊆ dm
n
(X) and
X ⊆ nm(X), and m,n be two positive integers such that n ≥ m:
lfpX .dmn
=
⋃
0≤k<ω
dkm
n
(X) (20)
gfpX .dnm
=
⋂
0≤k<ω
dkn
m
(nn(X)) (21)
Proof. (20) First , we prove that
⋃
0≤n<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is a fixpoint by the following se-
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ries of equations:
dm
n
 ⋃
0≤k<ω
dkm
n
(X)
 = ⋃
0≤k<ω
dm
n
(dkm
n
(X))
=
⋃
0≤k<ω
dkm
n
(X)
where the first equation holds by the ω-continuity of dm
n
(Fact 5) and the second by the
fact that, since X is `mn-admissible by assumption and dm
n
is monotonic (Fact 4) we
have that: X = d0m
n
(X) ⊆ dkm
n
(X) ⊆ dk+1m
n
(X) for any k s.t. 0 ≤ k < ω. Second ,
we prove that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is indeed the least fixpoint containing X . Suppose,
towards a contradiction that there exists Y s.t.: X ⊂ Y = dkm
n
(Y ) ⊂ ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X).
It follows that X ⊂ Y = dkm
n
(Y ) ⊂ dkm
n
(X) for some k s.t. 0 ≤ k < ω. But, by the
monotonicity of dm
n
(Fact 4), we have that dkm
n
(X) ⊆ dkm
n
(Y ). Contradiction.
(21) The proof is similar to the previous case. First , we prove that
⋂
0≤k<ω d
k
n
m
(nn(X))
is a fixpoint, through the series of equations
dn
m
 ⋂
0≤k<ω
dkn
m
(nn(X))
 = ⋂
0≤k<ω
dn
m
(dkn
m
(nn(X)))
=
⋂
0≤n<ω
dkn
m
(nn(X))
which hold by the ω-continuity of dn
m
(Fact 5) and by the fact that, since X is mmn-
admissible by assumption, and dn
m
is monotonic (Fact 4), nn(X) = d0n
m
(nn(X)) ⊇
dkn
m
(nn(X)) for any k s.t. 0 ≤ k < ω. The latter property holds because X is assumed
to be such that X ⊆ dm
n
(X). By the antitonicity of nn and the interdefinability of
dm
n
as nn ◦ nm (Fact 4) we therefore have that nn(dm
n
(X)) = dn
m
(nn(X)) ⊆ nn(X)
from which it follows that dn
m
(nn(X)) ⊆ nn(X). A simple induction on k then es-
tablishes the claim. Second , it remains to be proven that
⋂
0≤k<ω d
k
n
m
(nn(X)) is
indeed the largest fixpoint of dn
m
contained in nn(X). Like in the previous case we
proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose there exists Y s.t.:
⋂
0≤k<ω d
k
n
m
(nn(X)) =⋂
0≤k<ω nn(d
k
m
n
(X)) ⊂ Y = dn
m
(Y ) ⊆ nn(X). There must therefore exist an integer
k such that, as a consequence of Lemma 3, X ⊆ dkm
n
(X) ⊆ nn(dkm
n
(X)) ⊂ Y . By the
antitonicity of nn and again by the interdefinability of d and n (Fact 4), and since Y is
taken to be a fixpoint of dn
m
, it follows that nn(Y ) = nn(dn
m
(Y )) = dm
n
(nn(Y )). Then,
from the fact that nn(dkm
n
(X)) ⊂ Y , and the fact that nm is antitonic (Fact 4) we have
that nn(Y ) = nm(nn(dkm
n
(X))) = dm
n
(dkn
m
(X)) which is a subset of
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X).
So we have that nn(Y ) is also a fixpoint of dm
n
, it contains X and it is included in
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⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X), which, by the previous claim, we know to be the smallest fixpoint of
d∆ containing X . Contradiction.
The content of Lemmas 3 and 4 underpinning the construction of the two fixpoints
is depicted in Figure 7. Notice that like in the standard case of d1
1
and n1 the two streams
can be generated by the indefinite iteration of the application of nn followed by nm.
The fact that n ≥ m is assumed, guarantees that each set of arguments dkm
n
(X) in the
lower stream remains included in the set of arguments towards which it is m-neutral;
that is, it remains m-conflict fee (and a fortiori n-conflict-free).
Remark 2. Like for the proof of Lemma 2, finitariness plays an essential role in the
proof of Lemma 4. However, also in this case the assumption can be lifted and the
proof could proceed using transfinite induction (cf. Remark 1).
4.2.1. Constructing Graded Complete and Grounded Extensions
We now move on to show how the above results provide constructive proofs of
existence of graded semantics. We will focus on finitary graphs, but it should be clear
that the non-finitary case can be handled by ordinal induction.18
Theorem 2. Let ∆ be a finitary AF , X ⊆ A be such that X ⊆ n`(X) and X ⊆ dm
n
,
with `,m and n positive integers such that n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Then ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X)
is the smallest `mn-complete extension containing X .
Proof. By Lemma 4, we know that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) = lfpX .dmn
, that is, the smallest
fixpoint of dm
n
that contains X . By Lemma 3 we know that this set is m-conflict-free,
that is,
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) ⊆ nm(
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X)). Since ` ≥ m by assumption, by Fact
6 and the transitivity of ⊆ we obtain that ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X) ⊆ n`(
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X)). It
therefore follows that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is a fixpoint of dm
n
, it is `-conflict-free and it
is the smallest such set containing X . As claimed, it is therefore the smallest `mn-
complete extension (Definition 8) containing X .
Corollary 1. Let ∆ be a finitary AF , n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Then ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(∅) is the
`mn-grounded extension of ∆.
So given an `mn admissible set (n ≥ m and ` ≥ m), the smallest `mn-complete
extension containing X is the least fixpoint of dm
n
which contains X (lfpX .dmn ), and
the `mn-grounded extension is simply the smallest fixpoint of dm
n
(lfp.dm
n
).
4.2.2. Constructing Graded Preferred Extensions
Theorem 2 implies that if we choose a ‘large enough’ `mn-admissible set X , in
the sense that such a set can reach through a chain of attacks any other argument, then
the indefinite iteration of dm
n
will yield an `mn-preferred extension (when n ≥ m and
` ≥ m).
18Cf. Remark 1.
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Fact 8. Let ∆ be a finitary AF , X ⊆ A be such that X ⊆ n`(X) and X ⊆ dm
n
(X),
and n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Assume furthermore that A ⊆ {a | ∃b ∈ X : b + a}. Then⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is the `mn-preferred extension of ∆ that contains X .
Proof. By Theorem 2 we know that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is the smallest `mn-complete
extension containing X . It needs to be shown that there exists no `mn-admissible set
Y such that X ⊂ Y . Suppose, towards a contradiction, that this is the case. Then
X ⊆ ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X) ⊂ Y ⊆ dm
n
(Y ) ⊆ {a | ∃b ∈ X : a  + b}. It follows that
there exists x ∈ Y ⊆ dm
n
(Y ) such that x 6∈ dkm
n
(X) for some positive integer k.
By assumption, there exists a finite path of attacks from X to x. So let X1 be the
smallest set of arguments thatmn-defends x,X2 the smallest set of arguments thatmn-
defends the arguments in X1 and so on. It follows there exists a j such that Xj ⊆ X ,
otherwise xwould not bemn-defended. It therefore follows that x ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X).
Contradiction.
4.2.3. Constructing Graded Stable Extensions
We finally arrive at a characterization of graded stable extensions as limits of
streams generated by the graded neutrality function:
Fact 9. Let ∆ be a finitary AF , X ⊆ A be such that X ⊆ n`(X) and X ⊆ dm
n
(X),
and n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Then, ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X) is the smallest `mn-stable extension
containing X if and only if
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) =
⋂
0≤k<ω nn(d
k
m
n
(X)).
Proof. ⇐ Assume ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(X) =
⋂
0≤k<ω nn(d
k
m
n
(X)). It therefore follows
that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) = nn(
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X)). We conclude that
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(X) is a
fixpoint of nn, that is by Definition 8, an `mn-stable extension. ⇒ Straightforward.
So, as in the standard case, graded stable extensions are the results of the conver-
gence of the upper and lower streams of iteration of the graded defense function (cf.
Figure 7). As in the standard case, such convergence is not guaranteed in general.
4.3. On the constraints n ≥ m and ` ≥ m
Theorem 2 assumed that the three parameters of graded admissibility `,m and n
are in the relation n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Notice that Dung’s standard semantics trivially
meets this constraint with ` = m = n = 1. This assumption plays a crucial role in the
proofs of the above results and one can in fact show that graded semantics for a choice
of parameters failing the constraint may not exist in some frameworks.19
19This is a situation fully analogous to the case of stable extensions in the standard Dung framework,
where they are not always guaranteed to exist.
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Example 9. Let ∆ be the AF consisting of the arguments and attacks in Figure 4iii).
Then ∆ has no 221-grounded extension. To establish this let us try to construct such
an extension with the construction of Theorem 2:
d2
1
(∅) = {b3, c3, d3, e3} , d2
1
({b3, c3, d3, e3}) = {a3, b3, c3, d3, e3}
So the whole set of arguments A in that framework constitutes the smallest fixpoint of
d2
1
. Such a set is, however, not 2-conflict-free, that is A 6⊆ n2(A). In fact no 221-
complete extensions exist in this framework, as these would have to include the set of
unattacked arguments {d3, e3} which, it is easy to see, 21-defends all arguments.20
Intuitively, the constraint imposes two properties on graded admissibility: first,
that the level m of failure of defense which we are willing to tolerate, should not
exceed the number n of counter-attackers we want for such a defense to hold; second,
that such a level m of failure of defense, should not exceed the level ` of conflict-
freeness that we are willing to tolerate. So to guarantee existence of a graded semantics
tolerating arguments for which m counter-attacks fail, one has to set the number n of
required counter-attackers higher or equal to m; and similarly, one has to set the level
of tolerance ` to internal attacks at least as high as m.21
4.4. Basic Properties of Graded Semantics
A direct consequence of Definition 8 is that graded extensions are in the same
logical relations as standard Dung’s extensions:
Fact 10. For any AF ∆ = 〈A,→〉, and integers `,m and n, graded semantics are
20See Example 10 later for another such example.
21Consider a 232-admissible extension X (where in violation of the constraints, l = 2,m = 3, n = 2),
and some x ∈ X such that x is attacked by two undefended attackers, in keeping with the m parameter
indicating that x can be considered acceptable up to a cumulative threshold of two fully acceptable (i.e., two
undefended) attackers of x. This level of tolerance with respect to the acceptability of x is then at odds with
the more restrictive toleration of the co-acceptability of x with a maximum of one attacker y ∈ X on x (as
indicated by l = 2). Moreover, the fact that a third attacker z of x need only be counter-attacked by two
arguments (as indicated by n = 2), means that one can still (given m = 3) consider z to be an acceptable
argument by the above reasoning applied to x, which in turn implies that the tolerated cumulative threshold
on attackers of x has been exceeded. Precisely when this sort of mismatch between levels of tolerance of
acceptability and co-acceptability occurs, graded semantics may fail to exist.
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related according to the following diagram:{
X ⊆ A | X ⊆ dm
n
(X)
}
{X ⊆ A | X ⊆ n`(X}
{
X ⊆ A | dm
n
(X) ⊆ X
}
adm`mn(∆)
cmp`mn(∆)
{grn`mn(∆)} prf`mn(∆) {X ⊆ A | nn(X) ⊆ X}
stb`mn(∆)
where two nodes are connected when the lower node in the pair is a subset (⊆) of the
upper node in the pair.
So all `mn extensions are mn-admissible and `-conflict-free; `mn-grounded, -
stable and -preferred are all `mn-complete extensions; and `mn-stable extensions are
`mn-preferred. We will further illustrate Definition 8, and the associated constructions,
with a series of examples later in Section 4.5.
Fact 11. For any AF ∆, and integers `,m and n such that n ≥ m and ` ≥ m:
{x | x = ∅} ⊆ grn`mn(∆) (22)⋃
S`mn(∆) ⊆
⋃
S`′m′n′(∆) (23)⋂
S`mn(∆) ⊆
⋂
S`′m′n′(∆) (24)
for S ∈ {grounded , preferred , stable} and any `′,m′, n′ such that n′ ≥ m′ and `′ ≥
m′ and `′ ≥ `, m′ ≥ m and n′ ≤ n.
Proof. (22) It is easy to see that for any `,m and n if x = ∅ then x ∈ dm
n
(∅)
and therefore, by Definition 8 x ∈ grn`mn(∆). (23) & (24) Both claims follow
from Definition 8 by Fact 6. The constraint on `′,m′ and n′ is necessary to guarantee
existence under such parameters.
4.5. Some Examples
Example 10. Referring to Figure 8’s AF below:
d1
2
(∅) = {d, f, g} ; d1
2
({d, f, g}) = {d, f, g} .
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So {d, f, g} is the smallest fixpoint of d1
2
and it is 1-conflict-free (as well as `-conflict-
free for every ` ≥ 1). It is therefore also the 112-grounded extension (as well as
`12-grounded extension for every ` ≥ 1) of the given framework. Consider now:
d2
1
(∅)
=
{c, d, f, g}
d2
1
({c, d, f, g})
=
{a, b, c, d, f, g}
d2
1
({a, b, c, d, f, g})
=
{a, b, c, d, f, g}
So {a, b, c, d, f, g} is the smallest fixpoint of d2
1
. However, it is not 2-conflict-free (ar-
gument a in the set is attacked by two other arguments in the set) and therefore it is not
a 221-grounded extension. To make it a graded grounded extension one has to tolerate
more internal attacks, setting for instance ` = 3. The set is indeed a 321-grounded
extension.
Example 11. Consider now the central graph (3-cycle) in Figure 1. We know that such
a graph has no grounded extension and the only complete extension is ∅. But one can
slightly relax the defence and conflict-free requirements to obtain a non-empty graded
complete extension. Set ` = 2, m = 2 and n = 1. We can construct the 221-grounded
extension of this framework as follows:
d2
1
(∅) = {a, b, c} , d2
1
({a, b, c}) = {a, b, c}
So, {a, b, c} is the smallest fixpoint of the graded defense function d2
1
and such a set
is clearly 2-conflict-free (that is, {a, b, c} ⊆ n2({a, b, c})). It is therefore also a 221-
preferred and -stable extension.
5. Ranking Arguments by Graded Semantics
The theory developed in the previous sections offers a novel perspective on how
arguments can be compared from an (abstract) argumentation theoretic point of view.
In this section we describe two natural ways in which the theory of graded acceptability
can be applied to define orderings on arguments: a ‘contextual’ way, whereby, given
a fixed set of arguments, one can rank arguments by how well they are iteratively
defended by the given set; and an ‘absolute’ way, whereby arguments are compared
based on their acceptability under given graded semantics. The definitions introduced
are illustrated by means of several examples in this section and later in Section 6.
5.1. Contextual Approach: Ranking by Quality of Defense
The same recursive principles underpinning the standard Dung semantics can be
used to characterise how strongly the set of arguments defended by a given set, defends
another set, and how the latter set defends yet another set, and so forth. That is to say,
given a setX—the context—one can iteratively apply dm
n
toX . Iterated graded defense
can thus rank arguments with respect to how well a given set X defends them:
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Definition 9. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be a finitary AF and X ⊆ A. For a, b ∈ A, we define
that a is ‘at least as justified as’ b w.r.t X as follows:
a X b⇐⇒ ∀m,n > 0 IF b ∈
⋃
0≤k<ω
dkm
n
(X) THEN a ∈
⋃
0≤k<ω
dkm
n
(X)
The strict part X of the above relation is defined in the obvious way.
As usual, a ≈X b denotes that a X b and b X a. When we want to make the
underlying AF explicit we use the heavier notation a X∆ b.
The key intuition behind this definition is the following. Take two arguments a and
b, and some fixed setX . Is it the case that every time b is defended through the iteration
of some graded defense function, a also is? If that is the case, it means that (w.r.t. X)
every standard of defense met by b is also met by a, but a may satisfy yet stronger ones
(recall Fact 7). It is easy to see that X is a partial order, for any X ⊆ A.
Example 12. Let us rank, by iterated defense w.r.t ∅, the arguments in Figure 4i-iv).
Applying Definition 9 we obtain the partial order shown in the Hasse diagram in Fig-
ure 4vii). Note that we assume one single AF ∆ consisting only of the arguments and
attacks shown in Figures 4i-iv). Under the standard Dung semantics, all arguments in⋃4
i=1Xi are in the iterated application of d∆ to ∅ (i.e., in the grounded extension of ∆).
However, we can now differentiate amongst these arguments. As expected the best ar-
guments are those with no attackers. Second-best is a2 whose attackers are all counter-
attacked by two un-attacked arguments. Third-best is a1, since a2 ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk1
2
(∅)
but a1 /∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk1
2
(∅) (and so a1 ∅ a2), but ∀m,n: if a1 ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(∅) then
a2 ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dkm
n
(∅) (and so a2 ∅ a1). We then have that a3 and a4 are incompa-
rable (recall Section 3.4.1). Formally, a3 ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk3
3
(∅) and a3 /∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk2
2
(∅),
but a4 /∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk3
3
(∅) and a4 ∈ ⋃0≤k<ω dk2
2
(∅). Critically, we can also differ-
entiate amongst the rejected arguments (those not in the Dung grounded extension).
Thus b1, b3, c3, c4, (each of which are attacked by one argument), are ranked above
b2, b4, d4 (each of which are attacked by two arguments).
5.2. Absolute Approach: Ranking by Quality of Justification
More generally, for a given semantics, we can rank the justification status of an
argument with respect to a given framework, exactly as we did in Definition 9 for
iterated graded defense:
Definition 10 (Ranking arguments by graded semantics). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF .
For a, b ∈ A, and for S ∈ {`mn-grounded, `mn-stable, `mn-preferred}:22
a S b⇐⇒ ∀`,m, n > 0, IF b is justified w.r.t. S THEN a is justified w.r.t. S.
The strict part S of the above relation is defined in the obvious way.
22Recall we are working with the sceptical notion of justifiability throughout the paper.
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Figure 8: An AF with two preferred extensions
As usual, a ≈S b denotes that a S b and b S a. Again, it is easy to see that
S is a partial order. When we want to make the underlying AF explicit we use the
heavier notation a S∆ b.
We illustrate how the ranking of arguments by graded semantics can be applied
to arbitrate between arguments that are credulously but not sceptically justified under
Dung’s standard semantics.
Consider the AF ∆ in Figure 8 that has two preferred extensions—X1 and X2—
under the standard Dung semantics. This equates with X1 and X2 both being 111-
preferred extensions in the graded terminology. Hence a and b are credulously justified,
while only f , g and d are sceptically justified. Typically, one would then rely on ex-
ogenously given preferences [6, 8] to arbitrate between such arguments. However, we
can make use of the endogenously derived ranking of arguments yielded by our graded
semantics to arbitrate amongst a and b. Intuitively, b is more strongly defended in X2
than a is defended in X1, and the graded semantics can make use of this information
in the standard framework to arbitrate in favour of b over a. Specifically, only X2 is
a 222-admissible (and hence a subset of a 222-preferred23) extension since only one
attacker (a) of b is defended by strictly less than two arguments, whereas X1 is not a
222-admissible (X1 is not a subset of a 222-preferred) extension since both attackers of
a (b, c) are defended by strictly less than two arguments. Indeed, ∀l,m, n ≥ 0: IF a is
justified w.r.t. lmn-preferred THEN b is justified w.r.t. lmn-preferred, whereas it is not
the case (as illustrated above) that ∀l,m, n ≥ 0: IF b is justified w.r.t. lmn-preferred
THEN a is justified w.r.t. lmn-preferred. Hence b lmn-preferred∆ a, so arbitrating in
favour of b over a.
It is worth noting that the contextual and absolute approaches to argument ranking
are related as follows.
Fact 12. Let ∆ be a finitary AF , n ≥ m and ` ≥ m. Then:
a ∅ b⇐⇒ a lmn-grounded b
23The 222-preferred extension is X2 ∪ {a}.
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Proof. The claim is a direct consequence of Corollary 1 and Definitions 9 and 10.
Further properties of rankings based on graded semantics will be discussed in detail
later (Section 7), in the context of other existing approaches to argument rankings in
argumentation.
6. Instantiating Graded Semantics
We have thus far focussed on graded defense, acceptability and semantics for ab-
stract argumentation frameworks. We now illustrate these notions by reference to in-
stantiated frameworks. In particular, ASPIC+ [8, 33] provides a general framework
for specifying logical instantiations of Dung frameworks. It has been shown to for-
malise human orientated accounts of argumentation based reasoning that make use of
Schemes and Critical Questions [25], and provide a dialectical characterisation of non-
monotonic inference in Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories [24] and Prioritised Default
Logic [34] (in [8] and, respectively, [35]). In what follows we show how our graded
semantics can be applied to both these instantiations.
6.1. Graded Semantics for Instantiations based on Schemes and Critical Questions
We use a well-established instantiated argumentation setting to illustrate the use-
fulness of the theory of graded acceptability for evaluating argument strength.
6.1.1. Schemes and Critical Questions
Schemes and Critical Questions (SchCQ) have been developed by the informal
logic community, most notably by Walton [25], and capture stereotypical patterns of
argument as deployed in epistemic and practical reasoning. For example, the argument
from expert opinion scheme states that if E is an expert in domain D, and E states that
S is true (false), and S is within domain D, then (presumably) S is true (false).
Echoing our motivation for graded defense and acceptability in Section 3.1, Wal-
ton emphasises that it is not feasible for reasoning agents to establish beyond doubt
the validity of a scheme’s presumptions if one is to effectively engage in epistemic or
practical reasoning. The presumptive nature of the grounds used to establish a claim
means that any given argument instantiating a scheme, does not in and of itself pro-
vide grounds for acceptance of the claim as having the status of true justified belief, or
being the decision option that indisputably maximises a given objective. Rather, one
establishes confidence in the claim sufficient to reason or act on the basis of the claim
[36]. Moreover, each scheme is associated with critical questions that render explicit
the presumptive nature of an argument’s grounds. For example, ‘Is E an expert in do-
mainD ?’ and ‘IsE reliable as as source ?’. A natural way to formalise reasoning with
argument schemes is to regard them as defeasible inference rules and to regard critical
questions as pointers to counter-arguments that may themselves instantiate schemes
[37, 38]. ASPIC+ arguments are built from such defeasible rules defined over a first
order language, and premises that are first order formulae. Arguments can be rebut
attacked on the conclusions of an argument’s defeasible rules, undermine attacked on
the argument’s premises, or undercut attacked by challenging the applicability of a
defeasible rule (via a naming mechanism for rules such that the attacking argument
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Figure 9: ASPIC+ arguments are upside down trees whose roots are the arguments’ claims and whose leaves
are the arguments’ premises. Notice that C1 asymmetrically undermine attacks B1 on its sub-argument B′1.
C1 and B′1 also symmetrically attack (C1 undermine attacks B
′
1 and B
′
1 rebut attacks C1).
concludes the negation of the name of the rule in the attacked argument). For simplic-
ity of presentation we will illustrate using rule based formulations of schemes defined
over a propositional language.
Contravening the notational conventions used thus far, but in line with the standard
notation in the instantiations literature, we will in this section use upper case Roman
letters A,B,C, . . . to denote arguments, lower case roman letters a, b, c, . . . for propo-
sitions, Greek letters α, β, γ, . . . for variables in schemes, and notation [a], [b], [c], . . .
to denote subarguments consisting of a single proposition. We will use the follow-
ing (abbreviated) schemes and (selected) critical questions, and instantiations of these
schemes represented as propositional defeasible inference rules (whose names are shown
as subscripts on the defeasible inference symbol⇒):
Argument from position to know. (APK):
• Source α is in a position to know about proposition γ;
• Source α asserts that γ is true (false);
• Therefore presumably γ is true (false).
APK critical questions: (APK1) Is α in a position to know about proposition γ?;
(APK2) Is α an honest/trustworthy/reliable source?; (APK3) Did α assert that γ is true
(false)?
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Argument from expert opinion. (AEO):
• α is an expert in domain β;
• The domain β contains proposition γ;
• α asserts that γ is true (false);
• Therefore presumably γ is true (false).
AEO critical questions: (AEO1) how credible an expert is α?; (AEO2) Is α an expert
in domain β?; (AEO3) Is α reliable as a source?; (AEO4) Did α assert that γ is true
(false)?; (AEO5) Is γ consistent with what other experts assert?
6.1.2. A Detailed Example
Example 13. Assume the premises b = ‘Blair is in a position to know about whether
removing Assad will achieve democracy in Syria’24 and c = ‘Blair asserts that remov-
ing Assad will achieve democracy in Syria is true’, and the rule b, c ⇒r1 g where g
denotes ‘removing Assad will achieve democracy in Syria’. We then have the argument
A1 in Figure 9.
Assume furthermore the premises h = ‘Chilcot is an expert in the domain of Blair’s
conduct in the Iraq war’, j = ’the domain Blair’s conduct in the Iraq war contains
proposition Blair lied about weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’, k = ‘Chilcot asserts
that Blair lied about WMD’, and the rules h, j, k ⇒r2 m (where m = ‘Blair lied about
WMD’), m ⇒r3 ¬q (where q = ‘Blair is an honest source’), and ¬q ⇒r4 ¬r1. We
then have the argument B1 in Figure 9, where B1 addresses critical question APK2
and undercuts A1 on the inference r1.
Intuitively, B1’s claim does not have the status of an incontrovertible belief, since
its grounds do not have such status.25 Hence, one may retain some residual confidence
in A1’s claim. Graded semantics allow for this level of granularity. So, in the AF
containing A1 and B1, A1 and B1 are in the 222-grounded extension.26
Clearly however, both our contextual (Definition 9, the natural context being ∅) and
absolute (Definition 10) approaches for ranking arguments would rank B1 above A1.
Example 14. Suppose an additional instance of the AEO scheme constructed from
the premises t = ‘The Arab League is an expert in the domain of Blair’s knowledge
of middle east affairs’ ; u = ’the domain Blair’s knowledge of middle east affairs
contains the proposition Blair is an unreliable source’ ; v = ‘The Arab League assert
that Blair is an unreliable source’, and the rules t, u, v ⇒r5 l (where l = ‘Blair is
an unreliable source’), l ⇒r6 ¬r1. We then have argument B2 in Figure 9, where B2
24Ex UK prime minister Tony Blair was appointed middle east envoy for peace in 2007.
25Commentators varyingly interpreted the Chilcot report’s investigation into the Iraq war (www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report) as asserting that Blair did/did not lie.
26All sub-arguments of A1 and B1, i.e., [b], [c], [h], [j], [k], and the sub-arguments of B1 that conclude
m and ¬q, are also in the 222-grounded extension (none of these additional arguments attack or are attacked
by any other arguments).
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Figure 10: AF s in which a1∗ ∅ a1, illustrating the analysis of arguments in Example 14 (i), Example 15
(ii), Example 16 (iii), and Example 17 (iv). In v) we show the two Dung extensions for Example 18.
addresses critical question APK2 (by claiming unreliability rather than dishonesty) and
undercuts A1 on the inference r1. We now have two unattacked arguments attacking
A1. A1 is now further weakened, and neither {A1, B1} nor {A1, B2} are included in
222-preferred extensions (the threshold of allowing one unattacked attacker on A1 and
thus maintaining co-acceptability of A1 with one such attacker, has been exceeded).
Abstractly, this equates with the ranking a1 S a1∗ (according to Definition 10) in the
AF shown in Figure 10i.
In the remainder of this section we will focus on `mn-preferred extensions and
assume S to be of such type.
Example 15. Suppose we now have only A1, B1 (and their sub-arguments) and the
argument C1 that cites an interpretation of the report i = ‘Chilcot did not use the word
lie’27 to conclude that Chilcot did not assert that Blair lied about WMD (¬k), so that
27Chilcot did not use the word “lie”. His report specified that it “is not questioning” Mr Blair’s fixed
belief, but the former Prime Minister deliberately blurred the distinction between what he believed and what
he actually knew.
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C1 undermine attacks B1 (on its sub-argument B′1 = [k]), and C1 undermine attacks
B′1 and B
′
1 rebut attacks C1 (Figure 9). In an AF consisting only of A1 and its sub-
arguments A′1 = [b] and A
′′
1 = [c], then for all l,m, n set {A1, A′1, A′′1} would be the
single lmn-complete extension. However, in the AF that includes C1 → B1 → A1,
C1 ↔ B1′ (the additional subarguments of C1, B1 and A1 are not listed here as
none of these are involved in attacks) A1 is not in every lmn-complete extension (for
instance, {A1, C1} is not 112-admissible). Abstractly, this equates with a1∗ S a1 in
the AF shown in Figure 10ii (absolute ranking), and a1∗ ∅ a1 (contextual ranking).
We note with interest that the higher ranking for unattacked versus reinstated ar-
guments (illustrated by the above example) is supported by experimental findings re-
porting that human subjects appear to have higher confidence in claims of arguments
that are unattacked, than when those arguments are subsequently attacked and then de-
fended [39]. This suggests that our theory of graded acceptability incorporates features
of human argumentation.28
Example 16. Suppose theAF ∆ that includes the argumentsA1, B1 and C1 in Figure
9, and the AF ∆′ that includes the additional argument D1 that cites another inter-
pretation of the report that concludes ¬k. Then D1 also undermines attack B1 on its
sub-argument B′1 and we also now have D1 ↔ B1′. The defense of A1 against B1
by {C1, D1} is now stronger than that offered by {C1} alone. Abstractly, this equates
with a1∗ ∅ a1 in the AF shown in Figure 10iii (contextual ranking). Furthermore,
{D1, C1, A1} is a 112-preferred extension of ∆′ but {C1, A1} is not a 112-preferred
extension of ∆. Abstractly, this equates with a1∗ S a1 in the AF shown in Figure
10iii (absolute ranking).
Example 17. Suppose theAF ∆ that includes the argumentsA1, B1 and C1 in Figure
9, and the AF ∆′ that now includes the additional argument B2 in Figure 9, as well
as the argument C2 claiming that the Arab League are not credible experts, so that C2
undercut attacks B2 (on r5). That is, we have that ∆′ includes:
C1 → B1 → A1, C1 ↔ B1′, C2 → B2 → A1.
Intuitively, A1 is more strongly justified in ∆ than in ∆′ since in the latter case we
have two arguments (B1 and B2) that continue to exert a weakening effect on A1 as
opposed to the one (B1) in ∆. A1 is in a 222-preferred extension of ∆ but A1 is not
in a 222-preferred extension of ∆′. This equates with a1∗ S∆ a1 in the AF shown in
Figure 10iv.
6.1.3. Graded Acceptability and Accrual
We now briefly illustrate, by means of a simple example, the relationship between
graded acceptability and the notion of accrual. In the following section we then show
how graded acceptability captures a simple form of accrual when applying graded se-
mantics to a dialectical characterisation of non-monotonic inference.
28We do see the theory of graded acceptability also as a contribution to the long term goal of providing
formal frameworks of argumentation accommodating both computational and human argumentation [40].
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Example 18. Suppose an argument in support of invading Syria, instantiating the
scheme for practical reasoning [41]:
Assad is suppressing Syrians, and invading Syria will remove Assad from
power, and removing Assad will achieve democracy in Syria, so promot-
ing the value of peace.
Now, as well as pointing to counter-arguments, critical questions can also be posed as
challenges to presumptions, shifting the burden of proof so as to provide an argument in
support of the presumption. So the critical question ‘Do the consequences of the action
achieve the goal ?’ can be posed to the presumption emphasised in bold in the above
argument (with the consequences being ‘the removal of Assad’ and the goal being
‘achieve democracy in Syria’). Suppose that in response to this challenge, the above
argument is then extended to an argument I that now includes as a sub-argument, the
argument A1 in Figure 9 whose conclusion is the bold text in the above. Now suppose
two additional arguments A2 and A3, each of which are instances of the AEO scheme.
A2 cites the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London who are
experts in the domain of middle east politics and who assert that removing Assad will
not achieve democracy in Syria (i.e., A2 concludes ¬g). A3 cites the United Nations
working group on middle east affairs who are also experts that assert that removing
Assad will not achieve democracy in Syria. BothA2 andA3 symmetrically rebut attack
A1. Moreover, both A2 and A3 asymmetrically rebut attack I on its sub-argument A1.
We thus have two Dung admissible extensions E1 and E2 in Figure 10v.
However,A2 andA3 accrue in support of each other’s claim (¬g) and so strengthen
each other at the expense of A1. Hence, although E1 and E2 are both subsets of Dung
preferred extensions, we have that A2, A3 S∆ A1, I (intuitively each attack on I and
A1 is defended by one counter-attacker, whereas each attack onA2 andA3 is defended
by two counter-attackers).
Observe also that C1 and D1 accrue in support of ¬k to strengthen A1 in Example
16. The incompatibility of accrual with Dung’s standard theory has been discussed and
argued for in [26]. However, as illustrated in the above examples, our graded semantics
partially challenges this view by showing how a simple counting-based form of accrual
can be coherently accommodated within Dung’s theory.
6.2. Graded Semantics and Characterisations of Non-monotonic Inference
A number of works [8, 42, 43] provide argumentation-based characterisations of
non-monotonic inference defined by Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories [24]. The latter
starts with a a totally ordered (≤) set B of classical wff 29 partitioned into equivalence
classes (B1, . . . ,Bn) (for i = 1 . . . n, α, β ∈ Bi iff α ≈ β) and such that:
∀α ∈ Bi,∀β ∈ Bj , i < j iff β < α.
A ‘preferred subtheory’ (‘ps’ for short) is obtained by taking a maximal under set
inclusion consistent subset of B1, maximally extended with a subset of B2, and so on.
29Where as usual, α ≈ β iff β ≤ α and α ≤ β, and β < α iff β ≤ α and α  β.
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Figure 11: Arguments in AF1 that defeat each other are connected by double headed arrows. E1, E2 and
E3 are Dung admissible (i.e., 111-admissible extensions). Only E3 is 112-admissible.
In this way, multiple pss may be constructed; for example (B1 = {¬a ∨ ¬b},B2 =
{a, b}) yields the pss {¬a ∨ ¬b, a} and {¬a ∨ ¬b, b}.
Classical logic arguments in ASPIC+ consist of consistent subsets of premises
∆ ⊆ B in support of a claim α classically entailed by ∆ (and such that no proper
subset of ∆ entails α) via a strict inference rule α1, . . . , αn → α (∆ =
⋃n
i=1 αi) that
encodes the classical entailment, and which we represent here as (∆, α). The argu-
ments constructed from B are then related by a binary defeat relation, obtained on the
basis of the attacks and a strict preference relation over arguments defined by reference
to the ordering on B:
– (∆, α) ≺ (∆′, α′) iff ∃γ ∈ ∆, ∀β ∈ ∆′: γ < β;
– (∆1, α1) attacks (∆2, α2) on ({β}, β) iff β ∈ ∆2, β = ¬α1 or
α1 = ¬β; (∆1, α1) defeats (∆2, α2) if (∆1, α1) ⊀ ({β}, β).
[8] then shows a correspondence such that each ps of B is the set of premises in
a stable extension of the AF consisting of the arguments and defeats defined by the
totally ordered B. Then α is a sceptical (credulous) ps-inference iff α is entailed by all
(respectively at least one) ps, iff α is a sceptical (credulous) argumentation defined in-
ference (i.e., α is the conclusion of an argument in all, respectively at least one, stable
extension). Moreover, it has subsequently been shown in [44], that the stable exten-
sions of any AF of classical logic arguments and defeats, as defined above by a totally
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Figure 12: AF2 defined by the base in which ¬a is ordered below a, b and ¬a∨¬b. E1′, E2′ and E3′ are
111-admissible extensions. None are112-admissible.
ordered set B of classical logic formulae, coincide with the preferred extensions.30 The
correspondence in [8] can therefore also be stated for preferred subtheories and pre-
ferred extensions, and so in what follows, we focus on graded preferred semantics.
We can apply graded semantics to AF s that relate arguments by defeats rather than
attacks. Firstly, assume B is the single equivalence class B1 = {a, b,¬a∨¬b,¬a}, gen-
erating the defeat graph AF1 in Figure 11 in which all attacks succeed as defeats (rep-
resented as double arrows). Note that for every argument (∆, α) shown, the AF also
includes the argument (∆, β) where β is any classical consequence of ∆. However,
no attacks originate from these additional arguments. It therefore suffices to consider
only the arguments shown in Figure 11, since these are the only arguments from which
attacks originate. Hence if an extension of AF1 contains a (∆, α) shown in Figure 11,
then it will also contain any (∆, β) such that ∆ ` β.
Now observe that E3 is a subset of the single 112-preferred extension that in-
cludes all arguments with consistent subsets of {b,¬a ∨ ¬b,¬a} (every defeat on
X ∈ E3 is defended by two arguments in E3). However E1 and E2 are not 112-
admissible, and are not subsets of 112-preferred extensions. Indeed, we obtain that
G,D,B,C `mn−preferredAF1 A,E, F according to Definition 10. Once again we wit-
ness how graded semantics can effectively account for a form of accrual. We have two
distinct arguments claiming ¬a (G andD) which accrue so as to strengthen each other,
and so privilege the inference ¬a over a. Moreover these arguments accrue in their
30It is well known that any stable extension of anAF is preferred. Therefore [44] focuses on showing that
any preferred extension is also stable.
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defense of B,C and D.
Notice that explicit preferences over arguments take precedence over the implicit
preference yielded by accruing arguments and the arguments they defend. Suppose that
B consists of the two equivalence classes B1 = {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b} and B2 = {¬a} (i.e.,
¬a < a, b,¬a∨¬b) generating the defeat graphAF2 in Figure 12. The fact thatG ≺ A
now means that G and D no longer accrue in support of ¬a and an implicit preference
for ¬a, and no longer accrue in defense of B,C and D. Now none of E1′, E2′ and
E3′ are subsets of 112-preferred extensions, and ∀X,Y ∈ {G,D,B,C,A,E, F},
X ≈`mn−preferredAF2 Y .
7. Related Work
We discuss related work and provide a detailed comparison of our semantics based
on graded acceptability with some of the approaches proposed in the literature.
7.1. Approaches to Graduality in Abstract Argumentation
The existing literature aiming at introducing some form of ’graduality’ or ’ranking’
in abstract argumentation can roughly be classified in two strands: those introducing
a more fine-grained notion of argument status, and which are closely based on Dung’s
theory; those that depart from Dung’s notions of defense, acceptablity and extensions
under various semantics, so as to provide a unique ranking on arguments, typically
through the use of techniques for value propagation on graphs.
Within the first category, [16] pushes the envelope of Dung’s theory by showing
how standard notions (e.g., belonging to or being attacked by the grounded extension,
belonging to some or no admissible sets, and being attacked by some or no admissible
sets) suffice to isolate six different statuses of arguments, without introducing an ex-
plicit notion of graduality. In Weighted Argumentation Systems (WAS) [12], weights are
associated with attacks, and Dung extensions are generalised to relax the requirement
for conflict-freeness, and allow for extensions whose contained attacks’ summative
weight does not exceed some predefined ‘inconsistency budget’. The case where the
weight of each attack is 1 (which we refer to as WAS1), and in which the inconsis-
tency budget therefore equates with the number of attacks tolerated in an extension,
invites comparison with our `11 graded semantics accommodating extensions that are
not necessarily Dung conflict free (i.e, when ` > 1).31 The first thing to note is that
WAS1 considers the neutrality of an extension w.r.t. the number of contained attacks,
rather than w.r.t. the number of attacks on any given contained argument. Moreover, we
have argued that toleration w.r.t. the co-acceptability of attacking arguments should go
hand in hand with toleration w.r.t. weaker forms of defence. However, the implications
of relaxing conflict-freeness on the existence and construction of Dung’s semantics in
WAS have yet to be studied in depth ([12] only notes that the existence of a unique
grounded extension is not guaranteed).
31We will in Section 8 suggest future research in which we generalise graded neutrality, defense and
semantics to account for weights on attacks.
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Amongst the graph propagation approaches, we mention the equational approaches
that assign a more fine grained ranking to arguments by evaluating fixed points of func-
tions that assign a numerical value to any given argument based on the values of its
attackers. In particular, the equational approach of Gabbay and Rodrigues [45] who
conjecture that their approach yields a unique solution for cyclic graphs, the com-
pensation based semantics of Amgoud et.al. [18], which assigns the same ranking to
all arguments in cycles and yield a unique solution for cyclic graphs, and the social
argumentation approach of Leite and Martin (LM) [23] (who are concerned with prop-
agating user votes on arguments, but also yield fine grained rankings without recourse
to exogenous information).
Other graph propagation approaches that do not use an equational fixed point ap-
proach, typically account for the attack and defense paths terminating in the argument
being ranked, where these paths are sequences of, respectively even and odd, num-
bers of attacking arguments. Besnard and Hunter (BH) [14] rank classical logic argu-
ments in acyclic graphs, through a categoriser function – v : A → [0, 1] defined as
v(a) = 11+
∑
b→a v(b)
– that assigns high values to arguments with low-valued attackers
(and the maximum value to un-attacked arguments) and low values to arguments with
high-valued attackers. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex (CL) [15] then generalises use of
this function to Dung AF s to develop (in their terms) a ‘local approach’ to valuation of
arguments, and then formalise a ‘global approach’ that they argue gives more intuitive
outcomes. Their approach requires a highly involved transformation of cyclic graphs
to infinite acyclic graphs. More recently, Amgoud and Ben-Naim [17] propose two
ranking-based semantics, which they call discussion-based (AB-d) and burden-based
(AB-b). These semantics are also based on the processing of attack paths and their
general applicability relies on conjectures concerning the processing of cyclic paths.
Finally, Matt and Toni (MT) [19] provide a highly original paradigm for ranking
arguments, defining argument strength in terms of the value of a repeated two-person
zero-sum strategic game with imperfect information.
7.2. Graded Semantics in the Landscape of Ranking-Based Semantics
Properties of rankings have been proposed by the above works, and a very infor-
mative comparison of these approaches—in particular LM, BH, CL (for acyclicAF s),
AB-d,AB-b and MT—in terms of whether or not these properties are satisfied, has
been provided in [20]. It is instructive to study these properties as they apply to our
graded rankings, in part because such a study reveals fundamental distinctions between
propagation based and Dung semantics based approaches to evaluation of arguments.
In what follows, we refer to absolute graded rankings x S y (Definition 10),
which are the more naturally comparable with the other existing approaches to grad-
uality. Unless stated otherwise, we assume S stands for any of the semantics in
{grounded , preferred , stable}. Moreover, we assume the constraint n ≥ m and l ≥
m. Albeit not essential for the comparison, this assumption streamlines some of the
proofs in this section. We now turn to the properties studied in [20], and discuss
whether our approach satisfies each of them. In doing so we will recall which ap-
proaches satisfy each property (writing All if satisfied by all, and None if satisfied by
none).
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7.2.1. Abstraction and Independence
Abstraction (All) states that rankings of arguments are preserved by isomorphisms.
It should be obvious to see that graded rankings satisfy this property.
Independence (All) states that the ranking of a and b should be independent of any
argument that is neither connected to a or b. Formally, the connected components of
an AF ∆ are the set of largest subgraphs of ∆, denoted cc(∆), where two arguments
are in the same component iff there is some path of attacks (ignoring the direction of
attack) between them. Graded rankings satisfy independence:
Proposition 1. ∀∆′ = (A′,→′) ∈ cc(∆ = (A,→)), x, y ∈ A′, and positive integers
`, m and n such that ` ≥ m and n ≥ m:
x S∆′ y =⇒ x S∆ y. (25)
Proof. To prove (25) we establish the following diagram of implications. For any inte-
gers `,m and n such that ` ≥ m and n ≥ m, for any extension S ∈ {grounded , preferred ,
stable} such that S`mn(∆) 6= ∅:32
y ∈ ⋂S`mn(∆′) =⇒ x ∈ ⋂S`mn(∆′) Assumption
m m Claim
y ∈ ⋂S`mn(∆) =⇒ x ∈ ⋂S`mn(∆) Conclusion
for x, y ∈ ∆′. We need to establish the equivalences denoted Claim in the above
diagram, for each of the semantics. Firstly note that, clearly, since ∆′ ∈ cc(∆):33
∀x ∈ ∆′ : x∆′ = x∆ AND x∆′ = x∆ (26)
S = grounded It suffices to show that ∀lmn satisfying the constraint we have
that grn`mn(∆
′) = grn`mn(∆) ∩ A′. We proceed by induction.34 By Corollary 1
grnlmn(∆) =
⋃
0≤k<ω d
k
m
n
(∅). For the base case, clearly d∆′m
n
(∅) = d∆m
n
(∅) ∩ A′.
Assume then that for i > 1 (d∆
′
m
n
)i(∅) = (d∆m
n
)i(∅) ∩ A′ (IH). By (26) and IH it
immediately follows that the same claim holds for i + 1 and therefore, in the limit,
grn`mn(∆
′) = grn`mn(∆) ∩ A′ as desired.
S = preferred First of all, one can straightforwardly show that ∀E, if E ∈
prf`mn(∆) then E ∩ A′ ∈ prflmn(∆′). So for any lmn-preferred extension in ∆
there is a corresponding lmn-preferred extension in ∆′. To establish the claim it then
suffices to prove the converse, that is:
∀E′ ∈ prflmn(∆′),∃E ∈ prf`mn(∆) S.T. E′ = E ∩ A′. (27)
32This condition is obviously relevant only for S = stable.
33Recall notation introduced in Definition 1.
34To illustrate the argument we use here standard induction, which to be precise works only for the case
in which ∆ is finitary. For the general case one needs to generalize the argument in the obvious way to
transfinite induction. Cf. Remark 1.
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To prove (27) an inductive argument similar to the above one for S = grounded can be
used by exploiting Fact 8, for each `mn-preferred extension. The claim then follows
again from (26).
S = stable . Assume stb`mn(∆) 6= ∅. It follows that stb`mn(∆′) 6= ∅. Then
the same argument used for the case of preferred extensions applies to prove Claim .
If instead, stb`mn(∆) = ∅ then it trivially holds that x ∈
⋂
stb`mn(∆) ⇔ y ∈⋂
stb`mn(∆), no matter whether y ∈
⋂
stb`mn(∆
′) ⇒ x ∈ ⋂ stb`mn(∆′). This
suffices to establish (25) for S = stable .
An inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 should show, however, that the claim
can be strengthened to ∀∆′ ∈ cc(∆): x S∆′ y ⇒ x S∆ y, only for S ∈ {grounded ,
preferred}. This stronger formulation fails for S = stable because of the well known
non-existence of Dung stable extensions due to arguments in an odd cycle ‘contami-
nating’ unrelated arguments. For example, in
∆ = 〈{a, b, c}, {a→ a, b→ c}〉 and ∆′ ∈ cc(∆) = 〈{b, c}, {b→ c}〉
we have that b stable∆′ c since b, but not c, is in the single 111-stable—i.e., Dung
stable—extension. However for ∆, there are no `, m and n such that b, but not c, is
justified under `mn-stable semantics.
So with respect to the properties of abstraction and independence, graded rank-
ings behave in line with most existing approaches to graduality, with some important
differences when the underlying semantics is assumed to be the stable one.
7.2.2. Void Precedence and Self Contradiction
The above example also illustrates why Void Precedence (All)—any non-attacked
argument is ranked strictly higher than any attacked argument—is also not satisfied by
graded rankings under stable semantics, as b ≈stable∆ c. However, the situation is more
positive under grounded and preferred semantics, for which an—arguably—natural
weakening of the property holds.
We need some auxiliary notation. Define the variant of the graded defense function
(Definition 5) that requires an infinity of defenders for any attack: d 1∞
= {x ∈ A |
∀y S.T. y  x, ∃∞z ∈ X S.T. z  y}. So this function outputs, for any set, the set of
arguments whose attackers are counter-attacked by an infinity of arguments in that set.
Consider now the smallest fixpoint lfp.d 1∞
of such a function. We can refer to this as
the 11∞-grounded extension. Observe right away that if the underlying framework is
finitary, then lfp.d 1∞
is equal to the set of unattacked arguments in that framework. We
have the following result:
Proposition 2. Let ∆ = 〈A,→〉 be an AF and let x ∈ A be s.t. x ∈ lfp.d∆1∞. Then
∀y ∈ A\lfp.d∆1∞ s.t. y 6= ∅: x 
S
∆ y, for S ∈ {grounded , preferred}.
Proof. Let y ∈ A\lfp.d∆1∞. Then y 6= ∅ and y is finite. Then let k = max {|z| | z ∈ y}.
It follows that there exists no 11k + 1-admissible (and hence grounded or preferred)
extension which contains y. Hence, if x ∈ lfp.d∆1∞ then x 
S
∆ y.
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A direct consequence of the proposition is that, if ∆ is finitary, the claim simplifies
to the standard formulation of void preference, that is: ∀x ∈ A s.t. x = ∅, then ∀y ∈ A
s.t. y 6= ∅: x S∆ y, S ∈ {grounded , preferred}.
Finally, and related to the above discussion, the property of Self Contradiction
(MT), which states that a self-attacking argument is ranked strictly lower than any
non self-attacking argument, is also not satisfied by our approach. Consider ∆ =
〈{a, a1, a2, b}, {a → a, a1 → b, a2 → b}〉, where a is in all 222-admissible (and
hence 222-preferred) extensions, whereas b is not in any 222-admissible extension,
and so b preferred∆ a.
So with respect to the properties of void precedence and self contradiction, graded
rankings behave essentially in line with most existing approaches to graduality. Some
differences arise with respect to void precedence, when the underlying semantics is as-
sumed to be the stable one and when frameworks are not finitary, in which case graded
rankings cannot distinguish between unattacked arguments and arguments whose at-
tackers are recursively counter-attacked by an infinity of defenders (lfp.d 1∞
).
7.2.3. Further Postulates
Cardinality Precedence (AB-d,AB-b) states that if the number of attacks on b is
strictly greater than the number of attacks on a, then a is ranked strictly higher than
b. Like LM, BH, CL and MT, our approach does not satisfy this postulate. This
is because our ranking also accounts for the number of defenders, as witnessed by
the incomparability of a3 and a4 in Figure 4, and the fact that a3 groundedAF a4 and
a4 groundedAF a3 (recall Example 12). It is worth remarking however that, as discussed
in Section 3.4.1, our ranking could be further refined to a lexicographic ordering giving
precedence to the minimization of attackers, that would then satisfy the cardinality
precedence postulate.
Quality Precedence (None) states that if there is an attacker of b that is ranked
strictly higher than all attackers of a, then a is ranked strictly higher than b. The
principle is not satisfied by our approach. We leave it to the reader to verify that given
e → c → b, e1 → d1 → a, e2 → d1, e3 → d2 → a, e4 → d2, then although each of
d1 and d2 are ranked lower than c, both a and b are incomparable.
Strict Counter-transitivity (LM, BH, AB-d,AB-b) states that if the attackers of b
are strictly more than those of a (i.e., cardinality precedence), or the number of attack-
ers of each are the same, but at least one attacker of b is ranked strictly higher than at
least one attacker of a, and not vice versa, then a is ranked strictly higher than b. Like
CL and MT, graded rankings do not satisfy this property. Consider the AF and rank-
ing of arguments in Figure 13i), where a and b both have one attacker (respectively
d and c). Then c SAF d, but a SAF b. In fact, a ≈SAF b. With respect to this, it
is worth observing the following. By virtue of our generalisation of Dung semantics,
analysis of any individual argument under graded semantics is inherently bound up in
the analysis of sets of (co-acceptable) arguments (recall the discussion in Section 3.1).
Now, observe that the strongest defense needed to accept the defender e1 of a, and that
then suffices to defend a, is when m = 2 (since e1 is not defended). But then any such
standard of defense also accepts b (since the attack by c need not then be defended).
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Figure 13: Frameworks and graded rankings referenced in the discussion of postulates for ranking based
semantics reviewed in [20].
Defense Precedence (LM, BH, AB-d,AB-b) states that for two arguments with the
same number of attackers, a defended argument is ranked strictly higher than a non-
defended argument. Again, like CL and MT, this property is not satisfied by graded
rankings, as illustrated in Figure 13ii), where the defended a and undefended b have the
same ranking. We again see that the analysis of any individual argument is inherently
bound up in the analysis of sets of (co-acceptable) arguments. In this example, the
strongest defense needed to accept d and that suffices to accept a, is when m = 2
(since d is undefended). But then this suffices to accept b.
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [15] propose a number of properties that relate to the
addition and extension of attack/defense paths.35 Improving the ranking of an argu-
35These properties, referencing addition of and extension (increase in) paths, assume that the arguments
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ment by Strict Addition of a Defense Path36 (None) is clearly not satisfied by graded
rankings. Indeed, the reverse is the case: a is ranked higher when un-attacked than
when attacked and then defended (as discussed in Example 15). Restriction of this
property to the case where a defense path is added only to an argument that is already
attacked, is satisfied only by CL, and is not satisfied by graded rankings.
Satisfaction of Addition of an Attack Path (All) means that the ranking of an argu-
ment a is degraded when adding an attack path terminating in a, and equates with a be-
ing ranked strictly higher than a1 in theAF 〈c→ b→ a, c1→ b1→ a1, xn → . . .→
x1〉, where xn → . . . → x1 is a path of attacks s.t. x1 = a1 and n ∈ 2N. This prop-
erty is in general not satisfied by graded rankings. Consider the example ∆ in Figure
13iii). The strongest iterated defense from ∅ (and hence the ‘strongest’ lmn-grounded
extension) that includes a is when l = m = n = 3. This defense also includes a1. Ob-
serve that: d3
3
(∅) = E0 = {k1, k2, h1, h2, h3, a, v,m1,m2, j1, j2, j3, x, w}; d3
3
(E0)
= E1 = E0 ∪ {a1}; d3
3
(E1) = E1 is the 333-grounded extension. Indeed, there is no
lmn-grounded extension that contains a and not a1. Intuitively, ifm = 2 (n ≥ 2), then
the defense of a requires at least two of h1, h2 and h3 (since v is unattacked and so f
must be defended against by n ≥ 2 arguments), but then a defense of any hi requires
that m = 3 (since each hi is attacked by two unattacked arguments). Hence inclusion
of a in an lmn grounded extension requires that m ≥ 3. But then any such defense
allows an additional attack path terminating in a1, while accommodating a1 under any
such standard of defense. Put briefly, and recalling our discussion of strict counter-
transitivity and defense precedence, it is the standard of defense met by h1, h2 or h3
that determines the strongest defense accommodating a, and this standard of defense
allows for an additional attack path on a1.
The two properties, Increase of an Attack Path (All except MT) and Increase of
a Defense Path (All except MT) are distinctive of the propagation based approaches
whereby the ranking of arguments is propagated down chains of attacks. Neither is
satisfied by graded rankings. The former equates with b1 being ranked strictly higher
than b, and the latter equates with a1 being ranked strictly lower than a, in the AF
in Figure 13iv). We have that b ≈SAF b1 and a ≈SAF a1. Once again, the strongest
standard of defense needed to accept a1 is that needed to defend c1, which in turn has
the same ranking as a.
To the above discussed properties, [20] also proposes that all arguments can be
compared according to their ranking, which is clearly not satisfied by graded rankings
(cf. discussion in Section 3.4.1), and that all non-attacked arguments have the same
ranking, which is obviously satisfied by our approach.
7.2.4. Discussion
We briefly comment on the above analysis and its positioning of our proposal within
the growing field of ranking-based semantics. Like all existing approaches, our rank-
ings satisfy key properties such as abstraction and independence, as well as void prece-
in the additional (extension to the) path are disjoint from the existing arguments.
36We use the term ‘path’ rather than the term ‘branch’ used in [20].
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Figure 14: AF in which a1∗ ≈∅ a1.
dence, albeit with some interesting caveats concerning graded stable extensions and
the finitariness condition. With respect to other postulates, rankings based on graded
acceptability tend to behave differently from approaches based on the propagation idea
(and appear to behave more closely to MT which is also underpinned by intuitions
different from propagation), for reasons inherent to the way graded semantics gener-
alise standard Dung acceptability. To recap, we recall the discussion in Section 3.1
where we emphasise that our graded theory of acceptability aims at capturing a notion
of graduality while at the same time retaining the Dungian focus on sets of arguments,
rather than individual arguments, as the units of analysis. Hence, as our above analysis
repeatedly shows, it is the defense of co-acceptable defenders of an argument x that de-
termines the strongest defense needed to accept (and hence determine the ranking of)
x. We further illustrate this point with a variation of Section 6.1 ’s examples of graded
semantics applied to frameworks instantiated by schemes and critical questions.
Example 19. Suppose theAF ∆ that includes the argumentsA1, B1 and C1 in Figure
9, and the AF ∆′ that includes the additional argument D1 that concludes ¬h (i.e.,
an argument addressing AEO’s critical question AEO2, by claiming that Chilcott is
not an expert in the domain of Blair’s conduct in the Iraq war37). Notice that unlike
Example 16, D1 undermine attack B1 on a different sub-argument B′2 = [h] to that
(i.e., B′1) undermine attacked by C1. We now also have D1 ↔ B′2. Now, A1 is not then
strengthened upon inclusion of D1. Abstractly, this equates with the ranking a1∗ ≈S
a1 in the AF in Figure 14. Intuitively, the strongest defense needed to accept a defender
(either c1∗ or d1∗) of a1∗, and that then suffices to defend a1∗, is when m = 1 and n
= 1. But then this is also the strongest defense needed to accept a1. Contrast this
with Example 16 in which C1 and D1 accrue in support of the same conclusion ¬k so
that both undermine attack B1 on B′1. Recall that this equates with a1
∗ S a1 in the
AF in Figure 10iii), in which the strongest defense needed to accept a defender (either
c1∗ or d1∗) of a1∗ that then suffices to defend a1∗, is when m = 1 and n = 2. This
standard of defense does not suffice to accept a1 in this example. Finally, notice that in
the contextual approach to rankings, we do have that a1∗ {c1,c∗1 ,d∗1} a1 in the AF in
37For example, because Chilcott was not given access to the relevant documents reporting on Blair’s
deliberations.
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Figure 14. That is, if we commit to {c1, c∗1, d∗1} (the context), a∗1 is then ranked higher
than a1.
All in all, our analysis shows that rankings based on graded acceptability yield
an original combination of postulates with respect to existing approaches, and show
how a graded generalisation of Dung semantics can contribute a rich perspective to the
ranking-based semantics programme.
Finally, we observe that in contrast to the above described graph propagation ap-
proaches, we have (in Section 6 and in the above example) studied our notions of
graduality and rankings as they apply to instantiated argumentation. In particular, we
have studied well-known instantiations of Dung’s theory yielded by the use of schemes
and critical questions, and classical logic instantiations that yield dialectical charac-
terisations of non-monotonic inference. We believe that such a study is an important
complement to the use of postulates in evaluating the intuitions captured by propos-
als for graduality and rankings. It is with this aim in mind that Section 6 seeks to
substantiate the intuitions captured by our graded generalisation of Dung’s theory.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
Summary. This paper has presented three contributions. First, we have generalised
Dung’s standard semantics by providing graded variants of the classic extensions stud-
ied in abstract argumentation, and studied their fixpoint-theoretic behavior. In doing
so, the paper also provided a comprehensive exposition of the fixpoint theory of stan-
dard Dung’s semantics (Section 2) which, to the best of our knowledge, was not yet
available in the literature.
The resulting graded semantics for abstract argumentation has then been shown to
enable a simple way of ranking arguments according to how strongly they are justified
under different graded semantics. We showed how this enables an arguably natural
way of arbitrating, in abstract argumentation, among justified arguments that are cred-
ulously justified under the standard Dung semantics, without recourse to exogenous
information. Such rankings have then also been applied to instantiated Dung frame-
works, specifically via ASPIC+ formalisations of ‘human orientated’ argumentation
encoded through the use of argument schemes and critical questions, and dialectical
characterisations of non-monotonic inference defined by Brewka’s Preferred Subtheo-
ries. In so doing, we have also shown how the graded semantics accounts for the mutual
strengthening of arguments with the same conclusion (i.e., the accrual of arguments)
within the Dung paradigm.
Finally, the novel rankings have been thoroughly compared with existing approaches
to ranking-based semantics, allowing us to highlight the similarities and core differ-
ences between rankings based on graded semantics and other influential approaches.
Future work. The paper has aimed at establishing foundations for a graded generali-
sation of Dung’s argumentation theory. Based on our results, many natural avenues for
future research present themselves. We confine ourselves to mentioning those that in
our opinion are the most promising.
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We observed in Section 3.4.1 that the rankings enabled by our graded semantics
are, without further assumptions, partial. The ensuing theory of graded rankings is
therefore less committal than existing proposals in the ranking semantics literature,
and could therefore be extended to accommodate further pre-theoretical intuitions. For
example, some application domains may warrant distinguishing amongst arguments
justified under the standard Dung semantics, by assigning a higher ranking to those
that have a higher number of attacks. For example, consider that scientific theories
establish their credibility to the extent that they successfully defend themselves against
arguments attempting to refute (attack) them. Exploring directions in which graded
rankings could be extended to capture this alternative intuition in a principled manner,
is clearly a natural direction of research.
Dung’s original semantics were born out of an attempt to systematize patterns
underpinning the semantics of all the main non-monotonic logics. Section 6.2’s ap-
plication of graded semantics to dialectical characterisations of Preferred Subtheo-
ries strongly suggests that graded semantics could offer a similar tool for system-
atizing paraconsistent non-monotonic logics. By relaxing the conflict-freeness and
self-defence requirements, paraconsistent non-monotonic inference relations could be
defined akin to the way in which non-monotonic inferences are defined by Dung’s
argumentation theory. As graded semantics enable a ’controlled’ relaxation of conflict-
freeness, these inference relations should be able to keep the explosivity of the ensuing
logic at bay. The development of these ideas can lead, we argue, to novel interest-
ing insights at the interface of paraconsistent logic and argumentation theory. This in
turn may motivate the study of rationality postulates for argumentation [46] that are
reformulated to accommodate paraconsistent inference relations.
Notice also, that in Section 6.2 we applied graded semantics to defeat graphs that
employ exogenous preferences to decide which attacks succeed as defeats, and high-
lighted how these explicit preferences take precedence over the implicit preferences
yielded by our rankings. The interaction between exogenous and endogenously de-
fined preferences is also an obvious direction for future research.
The theory of graded argumentation as developed in this paper has focused on
extracting graduality from information endogenous to standard argumentation frame-
works, essentially by counting the attackers of arguments. This intuition can however
be extended along lines explored by weighted argumentation frameworks [12]. We
briefly sketch how this could be done, assuming now each attack is assigned a value in
R+ by a weighting function w. Recall Definition 5 and consider the following alterna-
tive definition of graded defense:
dm
n
(X) =
{
x ∈ A | ρ({(y, x) ∈ x | ρ(y− ∩X) < n}) < m} (28)
where, for R ⊆, ρ(R) = ∑(x,y)∈R w(x, y). Clearly the definition of graded defense
given in Definition 5 is the special case of (28) where w assigns the weight of 1 to
each attack. This generalization suggests that the logic behind graded semantics can be
leveraged beyond the standard case explored here, and therefore also applied to existing
proposals based on weighted argumentation (e.g., [12]).
In Section 7 we discussed differences between rankings defined by graded seman-
tics and propagation-based approaches. Although, as we have shown, the two ap-
49
proaches build on different underpinning intuitions, it should be stressed that they
remain compatible. In fact an interesting direction for future research would be to
explore how features of the latter might be integrated with our graded approach. For
example, recalling the example illustrating that strict counter-transitivity is not satis-
fied, one might note that since b’s attacker c is ranked above a’s attacker d by the
graded ranking in Figure 13i, then the ranking could be refined to favour a over b.
Similarly, defense precedence could be enforced by noting that since b’s attacker f is
ranked strictly higher than a’s attacker c (according to the graded ranking in Figure
13ii, then the ranking can be refined to rank b strictly below a. By the same reasoning,
the ranking in Figure 13iii could be refined to rank b1 above b and so a above a1 (so
enforcing satisfaction of ‘increase of an attack path’ and ‘increase of a defense path’),
and the ranking a1∗ ≈S a1 in Example 19 could be refined to obtain a1∗ S∆ a1 by
noting that b1 S∆ b1∗.
Finally, Dung’s standard semantics lend themselves to natural dialectical interpre-
tations via argument games (cf. [47] for an overview). Given that graded semantics
retain many of the key fixpoint-theoretic properties of standard Dung’s semantics, we
believe that standard argument games—specifically the game for the grounded exten-
sion and for the credulous preferred semantics—could be appropriately modified to ob-
tain game-theoretic characterizations of (at least some of) our semantics.38 These types
of games would shed novel light on the under-investigated link between dialectical ap-
proaches to argumentation and the younger literature on ranking-based semantics.
Appendix. Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Fact 2. (1) We prove the two directions. ⇐ The claim follows from the
monotonicity of d∆. For any X , d∆(X) ⊆ d∆(
⋃
X∈DX), hence
⋃
X∈D d∆(X) ⊆
d∆(
⋃
X∈DX). ⇒ Assume x ∈ d∆(
⋃
X∈DX). By finitariness, and since D is
upward directed, ∃X ∈ D s.t. if y → x, ∃z ∈ X s.t. z → y Hence x ∈ ⋃X∈D d∆(X).
(2) We prove the two directions. ⇒ The claim follows again from the monotonicity
of d∆. For any X , d∆(X) ⊇ d∆(
⋂
X∈DX), hence
⋂
X∈D d∆(X) ⊇ d∆(
⋂
X∈DX).
⇐ Assume x ∈ ⋂X∈D d∆(X). By finitariness there exists a finite set X ∈ D
defending x. By the assumptionX is contained in
⋂
X∈DX , for otherwise there would
exist a Y ∈ D such that X ⊃ Y and x 6∈ d∆(Y ), against the assumption. We conclude
that x ∈ d∆
(⋂
X∈DX
)
.
Proof of Lemma 1. X ⊆ dn∆(X) holds by the assumption that X is admissible and
by the monotonicity of d (Fact 1). dn∆(X) ⊆ n∆(dn∆(X)) is proven by induction
over n. The base case holds by assumption as d0∆(X) = X is admissible. For the
induction step assume (IH) that dn∆(X) ⊆ n∆(dn∆(X)). We show that dn+1∆ (X) ⊆
n∆(d
n+1
∆ (X)). Suppose towards a contradiction that is not the case. Then there exists
38Games for all semantics could be obtained via a detour through suitable logic games. Cf. [48].
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x, y ∈ dn+1∆ (X) = d∆(dn∆(X)) such that x   y. By the definition of d, there exists
z ∈ dn∆(X) such that y   z. But as y ∈ dn+1∆ (X) there exists also w ∈ dn∆(X)
such that z   w. From this we conclude that dn∆(X) is not conflict free, against
IH. n∆(dn∆(X)) ⊆ n∆(X) follows from the first claim by the antitonicity of n (Fact
1).
Proof of Lemma 2. (3) First , we prove that
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is a fixpoint by the
following series of equations:
d∆
 ⋃
0≤n<ω
dn∆(X)
 = ⋃
0≤n<ω
d∆(d
n
∆(X))
=
⋃
0≤n<ω
dn∆(X)
where the first equation holds by the continuity of d∆ (Fact 2) and the second by the fact
that, since X is admissible, X = d0∆(X) ⊆ dn∆(X) for any 0 ≤ n < ω. Second , we
prove that
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is indeed the least fixpoint containingX . Suppose, towards
a contradiction that there exists Y s.t.: X ⊂ Y = d∆(Y ) ⊂
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X). It
follows that X ⊂ Y = d∆(Y ) ⊂ dn∆(X) for some 0 ≤ n < ω. But, by monotonicity,
we have that dn∆(X) ⊆ dn∆(Y ). Contradiction.
(4) The proof is similar to the previous case, but involves a few extra subtleties.
First , we prove that
⋂
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(n∆(X)) is a fixpoint, through the series of equations
d∆
 ⋂
0≤n<ω
dn∆(n∆(X))
 = ⋂
0≤n<ω
d∆(d
n
∆(n∆(X)))
=
⋂
0≤n<ω
dn∆(n∆(X))
which hold by Fact 2 and by the fact that n∆(X) = d0∆(n∆(X)) ⊇ dn∆(n∆(X))
for any 0 ≤ n < ω. The latter property holds because X is assumed to be ad-
missible, and hence X ⊆ d∆(X). By the antitonicity of n∆ (Fact 1) we therefore
have that n∆(d∆(X)) ⊆ n∆(X) and, since d∆ = n∆ ◦ n∆ (Fact 1 again), it fol-
lows that d∆(n∆(X)) ⊆ n∆(X) as desired. Second , it remains to be proven that⋂
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(n∆(X)) is indeed the largest fixpoint of d∆ contained in n∆(X). Like
in the previous case we proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose there exists Y s.t.:⋂
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(n∆(X)) ⊂ Y = d∆(Y ) ⊆ n∆(X). There must therefore exist an integer
k such that, as a consequence of Lemma 1, X ⊆ dk∆(X) ⊆ n∆(dk∆(X)) ⊂ Y . By
the antitonicity of n∆ and the fact that d = n ◦ n (Fact 4), and since Y is taken to be
a fixpoint of d∆, it follows that n∆(Y ) = n∆(d∆(Y )) ⊂ d∆(dk∆(X)). So n∆(Y ) is
also a fixpoint of d∆, it contains X and it is included in
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X), which, by
the previous claim, is the smallest fixpoint of d∆ containing X . Contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 2, lfpX .d∆ =
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X). So
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X)
denotes a fixpoint of d∆, and more specifically the smallest such fixpoint that contains
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the admissible set X . By Lemma 1 we also know that such set is conflict-free. We
therefore conclude that
⋃
0≤n<ω d
n
∆(X) is a conflict-free fixpoint of d∆, that is, a
complete extension, and that this complete extension is the smallest such set containing
X , as claimed.
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